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CH.4

INTRODUCTION

Closely related to the concept of client autonomy is the lawyer's obligation to give
"entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defens~ ofhia_rights and the exertion of[the lawyer's] ut~Jlostlear,ning and ability."1
This ethic of zeal is a "traditional aspiration"2 that was alrea(ly established in
Abraham Lincoln's day, 3 and continues today to be "the fundamental principle of the
law of lawyering''4 and "the dominant standard of lawyerly excellence.'15
Client autonomy refers to the client's right to decide what her own interests are.
Zeal refers to the dedication with which the'lawyer furthers the client's interests.
The ethic of zeal is, therefore, pervasive in lawyers' professional responsibilities
because it informs all of the lawyer's other ethical obligations with "entire devotion
to the interest of the client.''
The classic statement of that ideal is by Lord Henry Brougham in his
representation of the Queen in Queen Caroline's Case in 1821. In an early instance
of "graymail," Brougham threatened to defend his client on a ground that would
have cost the King his crown and might well have caused a revolution:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of,his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he
must not regard the alarm, the tonnents, the destruction :which he may
bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be
his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.6
Let justice be done 1
2

that is, for my client let justice be done - though the

ABA CANoNs oF PaoF'L ETHics 15 (1908).

RESTATEMENT (THll!D) OF THE LAw GoVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. d (2000).
CHARLES WoLFIWI, MoDERN LEGAL ETHICS 578 n.73 (1986) (citing GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON
PRoFESSIONAL ETHICS 24 (2d ed. 1860)); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty ofLoyalty,
29 EMORY L.J. 909 (1980); Monroe Freedman, Abraham Lincoln - Lawyer for the 7Wenty-Ji'irst
Century?, LEGAL;fu!Es, Feb. 12, 1996, at 26.
.. GEOFFREY C. HAzARD & WJLLWI W. HoDES. THE LAw OF LAWYERING 18 (1988 Supp.) (emphasis in the
original). The authors wrote this five years after the Model Rules were adopted. In their third edition,
the authors changed the phrasing, but expressly equate "diligence" in MR 1.3 with zeal, for example,
referring to "the basic duty of diligence (or zealousness)." I d. at§ 6.2 (3d ed. 20~1).
5 V(l) REPORT FROM THE CENTER FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 4 (Winter 1984). "The prevailing
notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client is the first, the foremost,
and, on occasion, the only dqty of the lawyer." Patterson, supra.note 3, at 918, 947. See also WoLFRAM,
supra note 3, at 580 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973)).
6 TRIAL OF QuEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821). The Queen was charged with adultery of which, as Brougham
knew, she was undoubtedly guilty. If convicted, she )Vould have been divorced from the King and stripped
of her title. Brougham's speech was a threat to reveal publicly that the King had been secretly married
to a Roman Catholic, which, by statute, would have caused him to forfeit the crown "as if he were
naturally dead." Moreover, Brougham's threat was particul~rly potent because qf the dangerous social
and political unrest at the time. See Monroe H. Freedman, H ffi'Y'/1 L01'd Brougka:rit, Written by Himself,·
19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1213, 1215-17 (2006); Monroe H. Freedman, Henry L01'd Brougham and Zeal,
84 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1319 (2006).
3
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heavens fall. This is t;!te kind of representation we would want as clients, and it is
what we feel bound to provide as lawyers. The rest of the picture, however, should
not be ignored. In an adversary system, there is an advocate on the other side and
an impartial judge over both.7 Despite the advocate's argument, therefore, the
heavens do. not really have to fall - not unless justice requires that they do.
The obligation of "entire devotion to the interest of the client [and] warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights" is not limited to the lawyer's role as
advocate in the courtroom.8 Undoubtedly, some of the most important, dramatic,
and controversial issues of zealous representation arise in litigation, a~d these will
be a principal focus of this chapter. It is important to remember, however, that any
lawyer who counsels a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or drafts a legal
document for a client must do so with an actual or potential adversary in mind.
When a contract is negotiated, there is a party on the other side. A contract, a will,
or a fonn submitted to a government agency may well be read at some later date
with an adversary's eye, and could become the subject of litigation. The advice given
to a client and acted upon today may strengthen or weaken the client's position in
contentious negotiations or in litigation next year. In short, it is not just the
advocate in the courtroom who functions in an adversary system, and it is not just
the client currently in litigation who may both require and be entitled to ''warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights!'

§ 4.02

MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHOOSING CLIENTS

The obligation of zealous representation begins after the lawyer has decided to
undertake responsibility for the client's cause. What obligation does the lawyer have
to accept every client who comes in the door?
Discussions of the ethic of zeal frequently assert that the lawyer has no choice
regarding the acceptance of a client or a cause. Consider, for example, David Dudley
Field's defense of his representation of clients who have been called (with undue
romanticism) robber barons. Field argued that he could not properly be criticized
for his choice of clients because a lawyer is "bound to represent any person who has
any rights to be asserted or defended."9
Similarly, Judge George Sharswood wrote that "[t]he lawyer, who refuses his
professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible,
usurps the functions of both judge and jury."10 Although such statements are
frequently accepted without criticism, they do not represent either ·professional
practice or professional rules. Judge Sharswood's lectures on legal ethics were the
principal source for the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics (1908), but Canon 31

7

See Chapters 2 and 9.
As Professor David Luban has written, "The ethic of zealous representation is generally taken as
a credo by lawyers in nonadvocate roles just as much as by courtroom lawyers." DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS
8

11 (1988).
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 7 (1988).
10 GEORGE SllARSwooo, Ali ESSAY oN PRoFESSIONAL ETHics 83-84 (1854), quoted in DAVID LunAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE 10 (1988).
ANl)

9

JUSTICE
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expressly rejected the view that a lawyer is bound to accept any client who requests
his services:
No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment.
Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what employment he
will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court for plaintiffs,
[and] what cases he will contest in Cowt for defendants.
Similarly, the Model Code stated that "[a] lawyer is under no obligation to act as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client,"11 and the
Model Rules state that "[a] lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose
character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant."12 In fact, lawyers in private
practice refuse to represent people for a variety of reasons, most commonly because
the·would-be client cannot afford the lawyer's fees. 13
If Qne begins with the erroneous notion that lawyers cannot exercise choice
regarding clients, there is considerable compulsion to conclude that lawyers must
have discretion regarding what rights are to be asserted. Otherwise, the lawyer's
working life coqlq bE) devoted to using means that the lawyer regards as repugnant
in order to achieve ends that the lawyer regards as repugnant on behalf of clients
with whom the lawyer does not want to be associated. In order to avoid that result,
Sharswood argued that the lawyer must not use lawful means that the lawyer
believes would have unjust consequences. For example, Sharswood contended that
a la~er should refuse to plead the statute of limitations in defense of a debt that
the client in fact owes.1 4
But Sharswood had it backwards. No lawyer is required to represent a client who
owes a debt but seeks to resist paying it solely on the ground that the statute of
limitations has run. The lawyer who is offended by such a cause can simply decline
to take it on. If a lawy~ chooses to commit herself to serve that client, however,
then the lawyer is duty-bound "to seek the lawful objectives of [the] client through
r easonably available means permitted by law,"115 and to "take whatever lawful and
ethical measures [that] are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor."16 It
is not for the lawyer to unilaterally deprive the client of a right that the legislature
has seen fit to provide and that the courts are prepared to enforce.
We want to emphasize, however, an argument made in the previous chapter. The
lawyer's decision to accept or to reject a client is a moral decision for which the
lawyer can properly be held morally accountable.17 Ind~d, there are few decisions

11

EC 2-26.
MR 6.2 cmt. [1]. The context is a rule that requires the lawyer to accept a court appointment
"except for good cause."
13 MR 6.1 urges the lawyer to "aspire" to provide at least fifty hours of pro bono services to people
of limited means.
14
SHARswooo, supra note 3.
15 DR 7-101(A)(1).
16
MR 1.3 cmt. [1].
17
Freedman did not always feel this way. In 1975, Freedman argued that it is wrong to criticize a
12
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a lawyer makes that are more significantly moral than whether•she will dedicate her
and skills to a partic.u lar client or cause.l'. Thus, even t}l~ "purely
financial" decision to accept only clients who can afford a $500-an-hour fee, and to
turn aw~y all others no matter how just their causes nrlght be, is inescapably a
moral decision.
intelle.~t, traitpl1g,

One of the most important considerations in deciding to accept or reject a clfent
is that th~ lawyer, in representing the client, might be required to use tactics that
the lawyer finds offensive. For example; a laWJ'~r might choose 'not to accept a rape
case beca~e of the likelihood that defen~g the case would require the lawyer to
attack the character of a rape victim in order to~discredit her testirnony. 19
The proper solution to the lawyer's moral objections to using such tactics,
however, is not for the lawyer to take the cas~ and the.[\.to deny the cli~nt his rights;
rather, the lawyer should r~ to taKe 'the ~e.20 AI~o, tM')awyer'wllo believes
that certain rights should not be recognized because they are morally unjustifiable,
coulj:l be a persuasive voice in supporting legislation to chang~ the applicable law.
Notwithstanding our belief that everydne is entitled to zealous representation,
the authors would decline to Undertake certain cases. For example, Freedman
stopped representing clients accused of rape, because he did not want to liave to
engage in the sort of advocacy to-which those clients are entitled.~ 1 Smith would
decline to represent police officers accused of brutality in the course of duty.22
However, both authors believe that public defenders ought not decline any c~es,
except on grounds of conflict of interest. The moral justification for public defenders
representing all clients, no matter the charge or circumstance, is t~e right of the
indigent accused to the same skill;zeal, and relationship of trust and confidence that
lawyer for choosing to represent a particular client or cause. "[l)f.lawyers were tope vilified for accepting
unpopular clients or causes," he said, "then those individuals who are most in n,eed (If representation
would find it difficult if not impossible to obtain counseL'! MoNROE FREEDMAN, LAwn:as' ETHics tN AN
ADVERSARY SYsTEM 11 (1976). Cf. MR 1.2(b), which appears to have a similar rationale. By the following
year, however, he had rejected that position. Monroe Freedman, Are There "Public' Inwrest Limits on
Lawyers' Adoocacy1, 11 Soc. RESP. 31, 34 (1976); Monroe Freedman, Personal Respon$ibility in a
P1'ofes$ional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 199 (1978).
18 The importance of accountability has been expressed in the following way: "Moral justification . . .
cannot be exclusive or hidden; it has to be capable ot being made public. . . . John Rawls has set it forth
most explicitly, under the, name of publicity, as a fonnal constraint on any moral principle worth
considering. According to such a constraint, a moral principle must be capable of public statement and
defense." StssELA BoK, LYING 92 (1978).
19 See Chapter 7, in.fm.
20
Lawyers can and do avoid certain general areas of practice altogether because of the !Uiture of the
representation or the associations it requires. You will find, for example, that clients lie: steal, and even
kill other people out of pure greed. If you don't want to be associated with such clients, you should not
go into corporate practice. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SHAw & VINCENT E. BARRY, MoRAL IssUES IN Busmess (4th
ed. 1989).
21

For a similar view, see Cookie Rido11i, Statement on Representing Rape Dejendant8, in LEGAL
ETmcs (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 2004) (discussing her distress at defending rape cases
after obtaining an acquittal for a client who raped again).
22
Bm see Abbe Smith, Defending Defending, 28 HoFSTRA L. REv. 926, 934-38 (2000) (supporting
zealous representation on behalf of a police officer who violently abused a suspect).
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fee-paying clients can expect. z3
It has done no good to write rules tha~ attempt to insulate lawyers from criticism
for the clients and causes they represent. 24 Lawyers who have represented
unpopular clients and causes have in fact been vilified, even by other lawyers and
judges.25 Nevertheless, the concern that people and causes will go unrepresented
because la}VYers fear criticism has proved ~ be baseless. 2~ Despite predictable
public condemnation, lawy~rs have come.. forward to defend "the meanest man in
1'few York,"27 a N aii death-camp gu~d.28 and Osama bin Laden (within days of the
destruction of the World Trade Center).29 Moreover, in the unlikely event that no
lawyer is avaiJaple- to \'~Pt;rs~n~ someope because of the repugnance of the client or
cause, an available solution is the appointment of an attorney by the court.30

§ 4.03

THE NE$D ~ EARN A LIVING AS A MORAL
CO~S;IDERATION

As the Supreme Court has noted, the "rehl-life fact [is] that lawyers earn ·their
livelihood at the bar."31 This is not a recent revelation nor a reason for embarrassment. More than~ century earlier, Abraham Linco)n C!)nsistently referred to his law
practice as a busit;1ess rather th~ a profession.32
Supporting oneself and one's family is a moral responsibility. Accordingly, any
23 See Abbe Smith, When Ideology and Duty Conflict, in ETHicAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995).
24
• See, e.g., MR 1.2(b): "A Iawxer's representation of a client ... does not constitute an endorsement
of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." As a practical matter, a rule
forbidding criticism of a lawyer for representing a particular client or cause could not be enforced against
lawyers, much less against citizens in general. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
25 See, e.g., MoNROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADvERSARY SYsTEM 9-20 (1975); Monroe H.
Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of JudgeJS - A Proposed Solution to the
Real Problem, 25 HoFSTRA L. ·R'&V. 729 (1997).
26 Far. more realistic, unfo~ately, is the problem that justice is being denied to people for no better
reason than that they cannot afford to pay lawyers' fees. See, e.g., MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JuSTICE ch.
9 (1980).
27
See MoNROE Ji.. FREEDMAN & Asss SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics App. A (3d ed. 2004).
211
See App. A, infra.
ze See There Is No Sw:h Thing as Absolute E11il: Interview with Notorious Lawyer Jacques Verges,
SPIEGEL ON LINE INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.spiegel.defmternationaVworldl
0,1618,691943,00.hbnl Oawyer who defended "Carlos the Jackal," Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie, and
former Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan stating that he ''would accept Osama bin Laden as a
client").
30
See, e.g., MR 6.2; Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (court-appointed defense
attorney held in contempt for refusing to proceed after having been denied leave to withdraw); Sanborn
v. State, 474.So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) Oeave to withdraw denied to court-appointed defense
attorney).
'
31
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 60 (1977).
32 See Monroe Freedman, Abraham Lincoln-'- Lawyer for the 'Pwenty-First ~t~ ?, LEGAL Tn.IES,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 26 (discussing DAVID H. DoNALD, LINcoLN (1995)). Also, Henry Clay loved the law, and
described his practice before the Supreme Court as "a very convenient and money getting business."
MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE 18 (1987).
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decision to turn down legal business for moral reasons has to be balanced against
the effect that.decision might have on one's ability to earning a living.' To recognize
that there are moral concerns on both sides of the issue serves to emphasize that
the choice can be an extremely difficult one.
We celebrate lawyers who take on unpopular clients and causes, and rightly so. 33
But we should also celebrate lawyers who turn down clients for reasons of
conscience. One difference is that representing a notorious client can make a
lawyer's reputation and career; turning down a client never does.
Ralph Temple was a partner in a law firm that was barely making enough money
to stay in business. One day, on~ of the pm:t,ners came in with an un}lsually lucrative
c~ient. In the midst of general jubilation, Temple ~aised the question of whether the
firm really wanted to represent this client - the. U.S. _lobbyists for a dictator
notorious for torture and murder of civilians. There was an extended and heated
debate. Ultimately, the client was turned down. The firm broke up for financial
reasons a year later. Temple never regretted his decision.
We do not believe that Temple's decision to turn down the lobByists for the
dictator was any less noble than, say, Clarence Darrow's d~on to represent
Leopold and Loeb, Michael Tigar's d~ision to represent the Nazi death-camp
guard, John Demj8J\juk,34 or Clive Stafford Smith and Joe Margulies' decision to
represent Guantanamo detainees accused of being Al Qaeda fighters." Certainly,
Temple's decision to turn down the lucrative client was costly and contributed
nothing to Temple's fame as a lawyer. 36
Associates, of course, have less power than partners..U> make this kind ' Of decision
and are more vulnerable if they raise issues o.f conscience.37 Nevertheless, even in
a difficult job market, young lawyers have exercised discretion in avoiding firms that
specialize in certain areas of practice. Also, young lawyers have spoken out after
joining firms. On occasion, assodates have requested that they not be assigned to
33

See Chapter 12, infra.

34

Tigar has eloquently defended that representation. See App. A, iyifro.; Michael Tigar, Defendi11{1, 74
TEx. L. REV. 101 (1995); see also Monroe Freedman, Th.6 Lawyer's Moral Obligation ofJustification, 74

TEx. L. REV. 111 (1995).
35
See CLIVE 8TAYl'ORD SMITs, Tas EIGHT O'CLOcK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD Sro&: FIGHTING THE LAWLESS
WoRLD oF GuA.~.AN.wo BAY (2007); JoS&PH MARGULIEs, GUANTANAMO AND TilE ABUSE oF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

(2006).
36
Another example of a lawyer exercising autonomy in choosing a client, even at a financial saerifiee,
is Professor Laurence Tribe's representation of the estate of Rose Cipollone in a cigarette productsliability case. Tribe won a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the warning label on cigarettes does not bar
smokers from suing for damages. He represented Cipollone without a fee. He had previously tumed
down a seven-figure fee to represent the cigarette industry in the case. Jeffrey Toobin, Sup-reme
So.cri~, Tas NEW YoRKER, July 8, 1996, at 43.
In contrast, Abraham Lincoln was indi.tferent to •whether he represented a fugitive slave or a
slaveholder. Years after he had begun to speak eloquently agairlst the evils of slavery, Lincoln
represented a slaveholder in an effort to recover run-away slaves. See Anton-Hennann Chroust,
Abraham Lincoln A1YU88 a Pro-SlAvery Case, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 299 (1961). In Lincoln's view, "his
business was law, not morality." DAVID l l DoNALD, LINCOLN 103-04 (1995).
37
This point is made in Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freedman's Ethics, 33 Aruz. L. Rw.

455, 457 (1991).

74

ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION: THE PERVASIVE ETHIC

CH.4

partic:ular cases. In a dramatic instance, a group of associates at a major firm in
Washington D.C. protested the firm's representation of the apartheid government
of South Africa. 38 The fact that they were successful should not obscure the courage
they showed in jeopardizing their advancement to partnerships. 39
An associate can also bring moral considerations to a client's attention, sometimes.. at no personal risk at all. For example, as an associate in a large firm,
Freedman was assigned to evict a tenant of a'major real estate client. In reviewing
the case, Freedman found that the tenant was a Korean War widow with a young
child. The only reason for the eviction was thllt the child had had difficulty turning
off her bath water one eveiiing, the tub had overflowed, and the ceiling below had
been damaged. Otherwise, there were ho complaints about the tenant. "If you want
to evict her, I'll do it," he said, ''but I wasn't sure you'd want to, given the facts."40
The client thought it over and decided not to evict the woman.

Turning down clients on moral grounds (as distinguished from suggesting moral
considerations to a client) can be costly and therefore can require considerable
courage. However, the decision of whether to represent a client is the point at which
the lawyer has th~ most scope for exercising autonomy. ,Once you have committed
yourself to serve as your client's zealous representatiVe, your ability to act on
conscientious grounds is, and should be, significantly limited.

§ 4.04

ARE THERE MORAL LIMITS ON ZEALOUS
REPRESENTATION?

Some critics of zeal ·argue that clients are not always entitled morally to
everything that the law allows them, and that the proper sblution is that zealous
representation be rationed in the lawyer's discretion. 41 The most influential analysis
of this kind is Professor Murray Schwartz's critique of what he calls the Principles
of Professionalism and of Nonaccountability.42
38

See Ruth Marcus, Covington & Burling Drops S. African Airline as Law Client, WASH. Posr, Oct.
C3.
A courageous but unsuccessful attempt to reject a client was made by twelve lawyers at Cravath,
Swaine & Moore. The client, Credit Suisse, had been identified in U.S. government documents as the
most frequent violator of rules against laundering looted Nazi gold. Some of the gold on deposit had been
extracted from the teeth of EW'Opean Jews and other victims of Nazi death camps. The firm had been
retained to represent the bank to oppose claims of the victims' survivors. The lawyers wrote in part:
uCredit Suisse earns through the Firm's involvement a legitimacy worth more to it than the wealth it has
hoarded ... In other words, the fee they pay the Firm buys them that which one is ~ost obligated not to
give those implicated in Nazi crinles." The Cravath firm nevertheless chose to represent Credit Suisse.
But ~ee Carrie Johnson, A't'l!nt Fox Rejects a Client, LEGAL 'liMEs 14, Apr. 14, 1997 (law firm declined to
represent insurance company which had been refusing for decades to honor insurance policies that had
been taken out by people later killed in concentration camps).
40 1b do this involved neither risk nor ~ourage. Professor Shaffer argues that a lawyer should not
avoid the risk by saying that she will follow the client's instructions even if the client decides to be
ruthless. Thomas Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1987).
41 See, e.g. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRAcriCB 011 JuSTICE: A TREORY oF LAWYERS' ETHJCS (1998); DAVID
LuBAN, LAWYERS AND J uSTICE 159 (1988); William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" About Ethical
Questions, 27 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1998).
42
Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal oftlw Civil Advocate, in TRE Gooo LAwYER 151 (David Luban ed.,

5.

1985;~at
39
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His Principle of Professionalism states: "When acting as an advocate, a lawyer
must, within the established constraints upon professional behavior, maximize the
h"kelihood that the client will prevaiL"
Professor Schwartz's Principle of Nonaccountability states: "When acting as an
advocate for a client according to the Principle of Professionalism, a lawyer is
neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the
ends achieved!'
Our focus is on the reference to moral accountability. (If the lawyer is acting
"within the established constraints upon professional behavior,"'then by definition
she is neither legally nor professionally accountable for what she does.) In moral
terms, Schwartz's principles posit that the lawyer "can properly refuse to be called
to account with respect to the morality of the means used or ends achieved on behalf
of the client."43 In the next two sentences, however, Schwartz states the proposition
differently: the lawyer, he says, ''is beyond reproof for acting behalfofthe. client,"
and the lawyer has become totally "immune from [moral] accountability."«<
Understandably, Schwartz disapproves of the idea that lawyers shoUld be entirely
free from any moral accountability whatsoever in their professional role.

on

However, Schwartz confuses two issues that should be considered separately. It
is one thing to say that a lawyer can properly be held morally accountable for
choosing to "act[] on behalf of" a particular client. It is quite another to say that a
lawyer can properly be subjected to moral censure for using lawful means to achieve
a client's lawful ends. As discussed earlier, Schwartz is coiTect in concluding that a
lawyer can be held morally accountable for accepting an immoral cause. 45 He is
wrong, however, in suggesting that the advocate's zeal on behalf of a client should
be constricted by moral standards that have not been enacted into .law by the
legislature or recognized by the courts. 46
Because Freedman's position has been misunderstood in the past,47 let us
reiterate it. Lawyers are morally accountable. A lawyer can be "called to account"
and is not ''beyond reproof" for the decision to {'Ccept a particular client or caus~.
Also, while representing a client, the lawyer should counsel the client regarding the
moral a.~pects of the representation. If a lawyer chooses to represent a client,
1984); Murray L. Schwartz, The PmfesB'ionalism mui Acccuntability of La:iJJyerB, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669
(1978).
43
44

Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, supra note 42 (emphasis added).
ld. (emphasis added).

45 To guard against the remote possibility that a client with a legal right to litigate might be denied
that right altogether, Schwartz recognizes that "the last lawyer in town" should be required to take the

case.
48

Along the same line, Luban has argued that the ethical rules be redrafted "to allow lawyers to forgo
immoral tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends without withdrawing, even if their clients insist that they
use these tactics or pursue these ends." DAVID LOBAN, LAWYERS AND JuSTicE (1988). Professor William
Simon has gone further, arguing that lawyers ought to pursue each lawyer's personal view of justice over
the client's interest. See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, TuE PRACTICE oF JuSTICE: A THEORY or LAWYERS'
ETHICS (1998).
47

,

These views have been in print since at least 1975. See note 25, supra. Nevertheless, critics
purporting to analyze Professor Freedman's position on lawyers' ethics often fail to take them into
account. See, e.g., DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JuSTICE (1988); THE Gooo LAWYER (David Luban ed., 1984).
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however, it would be immoral as well as unprofessional for the lawyer, either by
concealment or coercion, to deprive the client of lawful rights that the client elects
to pursue after appropriate counseling.
The O.J. Simpson case produced a renewed onslaught of criticism of zeaious
representation, focusing particularly on criminal defense advocacy. 48 Defense
strategies and tactics that had traditionally been regarded as consistent with the
ethic of zealous advocacy<'9 were attacked as overly aggressive, immoral, or
insensitive,50 and defense lawyers found the.mselves repeatedly having to explain or
justify their role.51
One criticism of the defense iri Simpson's case is that they "played the race caril."
They did this by stressing the virulent racism of Mark Fuhrman, the police
detective who was a principal witness for the prosecution. For example, the defense
showed that Fuhrman had lied when he had claimed that he did not use the word
''nigger.'; The defense also rev~aled that Fuhrman had boasted of mesting
African-American men in the company of white women. Although the defense did
indeed "plaY.: 'the race card," it was the state that had de~lt it, by knowingly
employing and promoting an outspoken racist on the police force and by showcasing
him as a witness for the prosecution.52
For our own part, we would rather live in a society in which a guilty O.J. Simpson

48
The critics i.nclude commentators who were once supporters of zealous criminal defense advocacy.
See, ~g., Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The EthiC3 of Lord Brougham and
the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 291, 321 (1998) (urging a return to "civility, trust,
and fair dealing"). For an illustration of some of the trial tactics of the defense in the O.J. Simpson case,
see JEPFREY'lboarn, THE RuN or H1s LIFE: THE PEOPLE VERsus O.J. SIMPSON 144-67,208-26, 419-21,428-24

(1996).
49

See Chapter 4, infra.

See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND J uSTICE 1~ (1988) (arguing that defense lawyers should not
cross-examine a rape complainant about her "sex life" even when the defense is consent); Anthony Alfieri,
Defending Racial Vwlence, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995) (argUing that criminal lawyers perpetuate
racist stereotypes. by putting forward "racialized" defense theories); William Simon, The Ethics of
Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1704-{)5 (1993) (asserting that criminal defense lawyers
routinely engage in unscrupulous practices in the name of "aggressive defense"). For a response to
Luban's argument on the cross-examination of rape complainants, see Abbe Smith, Rosie O'NeiU Goes
to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 42-45 (1993).
50

Notwithstanding his own criticism of some defense practices, David Luban presents a forceful
refutation to Wllliam Simon's argument for limits on defense advocacy. See David Luban, Are Criminal
Defenders Different?, 91 MicH. L. REV. 1729 (1993).
111 See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case far Unmitigated Zeal em Behalf of Peqple
Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HoFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000) (defending the ethics of defense tactics in the
Abner. Louima case in which Brooklyn police officers were accused of viciously assaulting a man);
Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 TEx. L. REV. 101, 101 (1995) (defending his representation of Terry
Nichols, accused of participating in the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995).
52
The phrase, "play the race card" belittles racism (as it is intended to do) when it is used to describe
justified efforts by the defense to counter racism inherent in the prosecution's case. An interesting
variation on this theme is recounted in Steven Lubet, StoryteUing and Trials: Playing the "Race Ca:rd"
in Nineteenth-Century ltol.y, 48 UCLA L. REV. 49 (2001) (describing an effort to counter anti-Semitism
in a prosecution).
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goes free than one that tolerates {J<llice officers like Mark Fuhnnan. ~3 Moreover, a.s
Professor Alan Dershowitz (a member of the O.J. Simpson defense team) has said,
"I h~ve been a~cused sev~ral times of overzealous'ness. I confess my. guilt. In a world
full of underzealous, 'lazy,. and ipeompetent defense, lawyers, I am, proud to be
regarded a.s pvet;zealous on behalf of my clients."~
TWo especially disturbing critiques of criminal defense advocacy have been
offered by William Simon and Anthony Alfieri.5 5 In Simon's article, "The Ethics of
Criminal Defense,"56 he argues that defense law;yers routine~ engage in overly
aggressive.and "ethically,questionable" practices, such as delaying a case in.order
to frustrate government witnesses, presenting perjured testimony by defendants,
and ' embarrassing or blaming alleged victims. ~7 Simon acknowledges that the
tactics he refers to are not prohibited by either law or ethical rules. ~a But he thinks
such tactics ·are wrong.
Simon also rejects the argument that criminal defense is 1 'different~', from ot~er
law practice, in a way that justifies a more aggressive level of advocacy.119 He
dismisses as empty rhetoric the suggestion that the state is powerful and pt>tentially
dangerous to individual liberties by asserting that there is no state, only "harassed,
overworked bureaucrats."GO Thus, with a few fatuous phrases, Simon minimizes the
enormous resources . of the prosecutioh, including police investigators and the
backup facilities of the FBI, and rejects the need for meaningful checks and

113

A senior Los Angeles police officer adm.itted: "Sure, they knew about Fuhrman; they had to· know.

Lots of people knew . . . and they turned the other way." Kenneth B. Noble, Many Black Officers Say
Bias Is Rampant in Los Angeles Police Force, N.Y. ThiEs, Sept. 4, 1995, at 6. A salutary result of the
"race carq" is that the L.A.P.D, Chief of Police is n<?.W "determil}ed to root ,out racist ~ops, as u;ged [four
years before] by the special comm.ission headed by Warren Christopher." Editorial, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26,
1995. It is highly unlikely that this would ever have happened had it not been for Simpson's acqu.it~J.
~4 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEsr DEFENSE 410 (1982). See also JAMEs KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THosE

PEOPLE? 256 ("I llo thiiik it's better to be overzealous than underzealous. Overzealousness can be
corrected by the prosecution. . . . Underzealousness cannot be corrected by anyone.").
115
Simon and Alfieri are both former poverty lawyers, now academics, who have written extensively
on lawyers' ethics. Neither has ever been a crim.inal defense lawyer.
M Simon, supra note 50.
' 57 /d. at 1704-22.
58
59

See id. at 1704.
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J.1 dissentiq~ in part and concurring

in part) (oescribing the defense lawyer's "different m.ission;• which requires a defender to "put the
State's case in the worst possible light, regardlesS of what he thinks or knows to be the truth"); see also
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusrJCE, supra note 46, at 58-66 (exempting crim.inal defense from a critique
of adversary ethics); David Luban, Are Ori:ntinal Defenders Different?, supra note 50 (arguing that
criminal defenders are different from civil lawyers); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985) (acknowledging that ''the case for undiluted partisanship is
most compelling" in crim.inal defense); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as P,rofessional.s: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 12 (1976) ("[I]t makes sense to charge the defense counsel with the job of making
the best possible cause for the accused - without regard . . . for the merits. . . . But this does not,
however, justify a comparable perspective on the part of lawyers generally.").
60 Simon, supra note 50, at 1707-78; cj Luban, Are Oriminal DefendeTs Different?, supra note 50, at
1735.
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balances in the administration of justice.61
Alfieri's critique is more limited 'tha~ Simon's.62 He has no objection to zealous
advocacy on behalf of criminal defendants,63 so long a.S the advocacy does not
perpetuate "dominant narratives"64 about race, or "exploit racial •differ ence."6 5 He
acknowledges the high risk of "state violence"66 in the criminat justice system. but
is less concerp9P with. the power of the state to prpsecute and to abuse individuals
than with the power of individu~s to injure "the community."67
Alfieri illustl,ates what he considers to be the use of racism in criminal defense
with a defense theory used by lawyers on behalf of two African-American men
prosecuted for crimes arising out of the riots following the Rodney King verdiCt in
Los Angeles in "1992.68 The defense lawyers maintained that their clients' state of
mind had been affected by the "group co~tagion of mob violence."69 Because ·the
defendants were African-American, Alfieri contends that . this defense strategy
perpetuated racism, by reinforcing the stereotype of the deviant, out-of-control
black man. 70
Whatever one ·thinks of the group-contagion defense, it does not depend upon
racist stereotypes since it could also be us~d in a case of violence .during rioting };ly
whites.11.1n fa~t, that is precisely what Attic~ Finch, the lawyer-hero of To Kill a
Mockingbird, did when he portrayed Walter Cunningham, the leader of a .white
61 See Luban, A-re Criminal Deferukrs Different?, supra note 50, 173o-«, 1762-66 (discussing the
prosecution advantage in resources, procedure, and legitimacy, and noting the "two wor lds" of criminal
defense, one for poor clients with overburdened public defenders and the other for the small iniri'onty of
well-tffido clients with private lawyers).
62
F or a critique of Alfieri's views on criminal defense, see Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us:
"Race.C&nscious" Ethics in Criminal Def~mSe, 77 TEx. L . REv. 1585 (1999); see also Robin D. Barnes,
Jnterrocictl Vtolence and Racializelt Narratives~ Disoovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 CoLOM. L. REV.
788 (1996).
63
See Alfteri, Defending Racial Vwlence, supra. note 50, at 1321 n.149.
64
!d. at 1305. Alfieri defines "narratives" as the "rhetorical structure of criminal defense s tories." !d.
at 1304. When he refers to "dominant nan-atives" about race, he means defense th'eories, or "stories;'

that comport with prevailing racial ~tereotypes. His essay "challenges criminal defense lawyers' freed~m
in story-telling," id. llt 1306, by placing ethical limits on the theOries defense lawyers may advance. See
id. at 1331-42. See also Anthony V>Alfteri, [Jyru:hing Ethics: Toward 'a Theory of Racialized Def~mSes,
95 MtcH. L. R~>v. 1063 (1997) (continuing Alfieri's critical examination of race-based defense practil!es);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1293 (1998) (discussing the way in which "race· trials"
perpetuate racial status distinctions and hierarchies).

65
Alfteli, Defending Racial Vto/.e?tce, supra note 50, at 1321. For a thoughtful discussion of the use
of race and ethnic bias in criminal defense lulvocacy from a defense perspective, see Eva Nilsen, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reiian.ee on Bias and FrejUfi-ice, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL EnHtcs''l (i994).
66

Alfieri, Defending Rociat Vwlence, supra note 50, at 1321.
!d. at 1306, 132641.
68
P olice officers were acquitted of brutality charges in state court despite a videotape of them
persistently beating a prostrate King.
69
Alfieri, Defending Racial Vwlence., supra note 50, at 1301-03.
70 !d. at 1301-06.
71 See gene-rally Patricia J. Falk, Nrmel Theories of Criminal Defe-rtse·Bdlted on the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxicaticm, and Black .Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731
67

(1996).
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lunch gang, as "basically a good man." Finch explained Cunningham's attempted
murder of Tom Robinson by saying that Cunningham had just been ''part of a
mob."72
Alfieri does want criminal defense lawyers to defend the "subordinated" from the
powerful,73 and acknowledges that this is a "great burden."74 Nevertheless, he
insists that defense lawyers not only carry this burqen, but that they combat
igno.rance and advance racial harmony at the same time. Since defense lawyers
inevitabiy fail this quixotic challenge,75 Alfieri singles them out for blame76 in a
criminal justice system that is pervasively racist, from arrest to punishment. 77

§ 4.05

ZEAL UNDER THE ETHICAL RULES

J ust as some language in the Model Rules gives an incorrect impression of
modifying the tradition of client-centered representation,78 other language in the
Model Rules gives a misleading impression of tempering the profession's tradition
of zealous representation.
The Model Code expressed the axiomatic professional norm of zeal in Canon 7:
"A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of Law.'"e In
addition, the Code recognized that the lawyer's duty of zealous representation to
individual clients is an essential componen~ of the administration of justice.80 As the
Cpde explained: "In our government of laws . . . each member of our society is
entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the lay;; to
seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for
adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.'' 81 Thus, the Code expressly

72

HARPER LEE, 1b KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 168 (1960). For critical views of Atticus Finch, see generally
Malcolm Gladwell, The Courtlwuse Ring, NEWYOREER, Aug. 10, 2009. See also Monroe a: Freedman,
Atticus Finch -Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1994) (arguing that Finch is not a role model
for today's lawyer because he participated in and minimized racism, and because he never voluntarily
used his skills as a lawyer to ameliorate the pervasive racism in his community); Steven Lubet, On
Reconstructing AUicus Finch, 97 MICH L. REV. 1339 {1999) (arguing that Finch used sexist tactics in his
cross-examination of MayeDa Ewell).
·

73

Alfieri, Defending Racial, Violence, supra note 50, at 1804.

74

Id. at 1305.

75

Cf. Charles Curtis, The Ethics of A dvocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1951):

A lawyer . . . has lower standards of conduct toward outsiders than he has toward his
clients. . . . He is required to treat outsiders as if they were barbarians and enemies. The
more good faith and devotion the lawyer owes to his client, the less he owes to others when he
is acting for his client. It is as if a man had only so much virtue, and the more he gives to one,
the less he has available for anyone else.
76
Alfieri, Defendmg Racial Vwlence, supra note 50, at 1342.
77

See generally

DAVID CoLE, No EQuAL J usncE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1999).
78
Chapter 3, § 3.09, supra, "La)NYer·Client Decision·Making Under the Model Rules."
79 The Preliminary Statement to the Model Code describes the canons that head each of its divisions
as "axiomatic nonns."
80
EC 7-1.
81 /d.
SYSTEM
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reco"gnized that, in serving· individual clients, the lawyer serves the interests ·of
justice in a free society.
Accordingly, a disciplinary rule forbade a lawyer to ''intentionally . . . [f]ail to
seek the laWful objectives of his client through reasonably available means
pennitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules."a2o Moreover, that rule \vas not limited
to the lawyer as advocate, but was headed in general terms: "Representing a Client
Zealously." The message of the Model Code was therefore "clear: loyalty to the
client, regardless of ... other restraints, [was] the all-encompassing duty."83
The Model Rules do not include a specific rule that enjoins the lawyer to zealous
representation.84 Zeal is mentioned twice in the Preamble, each time expressly with
reference to the lawyer as advocate. The other reference' to zeal is in Comment [1]
to Rule 1.3. Rule 1.3 itself says simply that, "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligenc~ and promptness in representing a client." That is rather tepid language,
and the comment says permissively that "a lawyer is not bound . . . to press for
every advantage that might be realized for a client."es
Significantly, however, Comment [1) to Rule 1.3 adds the express command that
'![a] lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." Also, Comment·[l] begins
with the important injunction, which is not restricted to advocacy: "A lawyer should
pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconVenience to the ·lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
requfred to vindiCate a client's cause or endeavor."
In addition, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the Reporter for the Model Rules,
has written that Lord Brougham's statement continues to be the "classic articulation" of the lawyer's duty of zeal, and that it is "at the core of the profession's soul."86
Moreover, although "[t]he Model Rules contain no single rule that explicitly posits
the lawyer's duty, to the client in such sharp terms as in the Model Code, the overall
approac)l has not changed."e7
Despite some ambivalent language in the Model Rules, therefore, it is clear that
the obligation of zealous representation continues to be the profession's f)ervasive
ethic, or, in Professor Hazard's words, ''the core of the profession's soul."

82
83

DR 7-lOl(A)(l).

Patterson, supra note 8, at 947.
There is also little mention of zealous representation in the Restatement. However, Restatement
§ 16, comment d, recognizes zealous representation as a "traditional aspiration" of the bar.
85 Model Rule Ls cmt. [1]. Presumably, this refers to matters '"not affecting the merits of the cause
or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client." See MoDEL CoDE EC 7-7.
86 Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244, 1245 (1991).
87 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & WILLIAM W. HoDES, TRE LAw oF LAWYBRTNG 17 (1986). Regarding the author's
change in phrasing in the third edition, see note 4, supra.
84
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Consider In -re McAtevy:ae
He spr!lllg from his chair screaming, grabbed opposing counsel by. the
throat and began to choke him. The judge and the law clerk tried to
separate the two men who were now locked in combat, and at one point ;ill
four persons - th,e judge, his law clerk and the two attorneys - were
rolling on the floor. The judge s\lfl'ered minor injuries before the two
cOmbatants could be separated.
The New Jersey Supreme Court was more than justified in issuing •a "severe
reprimand" to the lawyer responsible for this unseemly courtroom fracas. Although
"a trial is not a mil'luet,"811 there is clearly a limit to lawyerly zeal. Model Rule 3.5(d)
sets that limit for courtroom lawyers. It forbids a lawyer to "engage in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal."
Unfortunately, however, there is a tendency among some judges to abuse their
power to hold lawyers in contempt. In a recent case in Ge\}rgia, for example; a trial
court held a lawyer in criminal contempt and sentenced her to thirty days in jllil and
a $500 flne.90 The charges included "repeatedly challeng[ing] the trial court's
rulings . . . [and] inai?propriate facial expressions [and a] disrespectful tone of
voice."111 The. lawyer was found guilty o{ making statement& that "jmpu~ed,
disparaged, and attacked the impartiality of the court and thereby undermined its
'
authority, respect, and dignity."e2
I

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the lawyer's conviction. In doing so, the
court overruled its own prior s~ndard that statements by counsel could be found
contemptu~ms if they posed a "clear. ~d present danger to the administration of
justice:' in part because the vagueness of that standard had led to inconsistent
results.113 In addition, the standard had not given adequate regard to "the
represented party's rights to «.ounsel and due process of law.".. Accordingly, the
court held that a lawyer cannot be held in contempt without a finding, beyond a
reasona,ble doubt, that (1) theJawyer has created an actual or an inuninent threat
of interference with the administration of justice, and (2) that the lawyer knew or
should have known that her statements and conduct exceeded the outennost bounds
of petmissible advocacy.95 Moreover, the court held that "doubts should be re5olved

88

In re McAlevy, 69 N.J. 349, 354 A.2d 289, 290 (1976), quoted in Francis D. Doucette, Adwcacy and

Chivalry, CASE &

48 (July-Aug. 1987).
Taylor v. United States, 418 ~.2d 1095, 1096 (1969).
90
In re Jefferson, 657 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. 2008).
111
I d. at 830-31.•
112 I d. at 831.
113
I d. at 831-32.
94 I d., relying on In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) (strenuous and persistent advocacy should
not constitute contempt unless it blocks court's perfonnance of judicial duty, as "it is 0 essential to a fair
administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest good·t'aith efforts to present their Client's
eases").
CoMMENT

89

95

/d. at 833. The court added a number of factors that should be considered, including notice to the
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in favor of vigorous advocacy."96
The problem is, in part, one of perspective. Along with a great deal of mutual
respect between judges and the lawyers who appear before them, there is also a
considerable amount of tension. One reason for that tension is the fact that the
judge and the advo'cates have different functions. The lawyers are committed to
seek justice as defined by the interests of their clients, while the judge is dedicated
to doing justice between the parties. From the perspective of the judge, therefore,
at least one lawY-er in each case is attempting to achieve something to which her
client is not entitled. From the perspective of the lawyer, however, the judge is
always poised to deprive her client of something to which the client is entitled. In
the words of Profel'SOr Louis Raveson, "some level of emotional reaction, some
degree of teJ;llporary animosity, and a measure of turmoil, are part of the natural
proc.esses of trial advocacy." 97
Moreover, a judge's concern with moving the court's calendar expeditiously is not
always compatible with what a litigant considers to be necessary for~ full and fair
hearing., Frequently, therefore, judges and advocates have ,differing ·views about
how much process is due.Jn a particular 1llatter.
How far, then, should an advocate go in pressing a point before a judge who
would prefer not to hear more? Ordinarily, the answer iS tactical rather than ethical..
The purpose of argument is to persuade, and tactics that are offensive to the judge
are not likely to aid in persuasion.
There are occasions, however, when a judge appears to have decided an issue
without a full appreciation of the facts o~ law, or when there is no hope of changing
necessary to establish an adequate record for
a judge's ruling but when it
purposes of appeal. In such cases, the advocate's responsibility is to represent the
cfient's interests effectively, even in the face of improper judicial efforts tO pressure
tHe laWY.er to forbear. As Chief Justice Warren Burger has emphasized, the
advocate; although an "officer of· the court,'' must nevertheless ''repudiate any
external effort to direct how the obligations to the client are to be carried out!'98 It
is '1crucial,'' the Chief Justice noted, that a professionally quali'fted advocate 'be
''wholly independent or'the government."99

is

Chief Justice Bw·ger has also pointed to an important source for guidance. as to
the appropriate limits of deference to the court. In In re Snyder, 100 a lawyer was
suspended from practice for six months for conduct that was ''unbecoming a
lawyer prior to the contempt citation, the likely impact on a jury of the lawyer's conduct, whether there
has been a pattern of such behavior, the significance of the conduct to case as a whole, and the extent to
which, if any, the court had provoked the lawyer's conduct. !d. at 838.
96

!d. at 883-84 (citing United States ex reL Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972)).

97

Louis Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Juditial C011tempt
Power; Prut One: The Conflict Between Advocacy and Contempt, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477, 514 (1990). ·
Professor Raveson's articles are e>.tremely important and have been influential in this area. See, e.g., In
re Jefferson, supra note 90.
98
99
100

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 327 (1981) (Bw·ger, C.J., concwTing).
Id.
472

u.s. 634 (1985).
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member of the bar"101 and "prejudicial to the administration of justice?'102 The
sub.stance of the charge W?S t~~t. Snyder had written a letter to a judge that was
"totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system" and that
"demonstrate[d) a total lack of respect for the legal process and the courts.''103 In
an opil;tion by the 'Chief Justice, the Supreme Court unimimously ·reversed the
disciplinary action against Snyder.104
The Court held that phrases like "unbecoming a member of the bar'' and
"prejudicial to the administration of justice,'' must be .read in the light of ''traditional
duties imposed on an attorney.''\os '~ore specific guidance,'' the Court said~ ''is
provided by case law, applicable court rules, and ''the lore of the profession,' as
embodied in codes of professional conduct." 106 Insofar as the codes of professional
conduct embody the "lore of the profession," it is worth relating some of that lore
in seeking to understand the rules of tthics, including the' ethic of zeal.

cqurt and counsel:
.
"JUDGE: You know that is a most improper question to ask.

Consider, for example, the following exchange between

.ATTORNEY: I know when a person has his mind made up, it is not easy to
change it.
JUDGE: I, do not want you to make a SPeech' now.
ATTORNEY: I am going to make a speech - that is what I am paid for."
In another case, after a series of contentious exchanges between the judge and
counsel over how the 'anguage of the jury's verdict should be r ecorded, the following
occurred:
JUDGE: "~ir, I will n(!t be interrupted:"
ATTORNEY: "I stand here as an advocate for a brother citizen, and I
'
desire that the [record be complete]."
'

I

JUDGE: "Sit down, Sir; remember your duty or I shall be obliged to
proceed in another manner [ie., with imptisonment for contempt of court].
ATTORNEY: "Yow· [Honor] may proceed in what manner you think fit; I
know my duty as well as your [Honor] kno'Y's yours. I shall not alter my
101

FED. R. APP. P. 46.

102

See MR 8.4{d).

1oa ·Synder, 472 U.S. at 637.
104

See also Lawyer's ProjaruJ Remarks aboUt Judge in Personal Matter Don't Constitute Contempt,

L Aw. MAN. ON PRoF. CoNDucr {ABA/BNA) § 18:10 (Jan. 2, 2002) (following criticism of the lawyer by the
judge in court, the lawyer told the judge's law clerk that the judge was "a f*•king bitch and that she
should not be on the bench''). In re Conway, No. 79615 {Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2001).
105
Synder, 472 U.S. at 645. Phrases like "unbecoming a member of the bar" and "prejudicial to the
administration of justice" are inherently vague and are subject to abusive e nforcell)ent. Unless they are
narrowly and cleal'ly d efined in advance, they do not give the kind of notice requil'e d by due process. See,
e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of·Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 {1991). The Court in Snyder did not reltch this
constitutional issue. 472 U.S. at 642.
106

Sny!Ur, 472 U.S. at 642.
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· ·- conduct."107
Each of those incidents has come down in our professio,nallore from the tradipon
of the English barrister. Neither case resulted in disciplinary ,action. Qn the
contrall, each episode has been cited' as representing the ideal of an independent
bar. For example, the advocate who insisted upo,n making a speech was Sir Marshall
Hall, a noted barrister of the earlier part of the twentieth century. His biographer
relates that Sir Marshall not only made his speech but "won the day.''108
The lawyer in the second ins4-nce was no less a figure in English law than Lord
Erskine Oater to become Lord Chancellor of E'ngland). According to Lord
Campbell:
This noble stand for the independence of the Bar would of itself have
entitled Erskine to the•statue which the profession affectionately erected to
his memory in Lincoln's Inn Hall. . . . The example has had a salutary
effect in illu.stra'ting and establishing the relative duties of Judge and
Advocate in England.•09

Professors David Louisell and Geoffrey Hazard introduced the .episode in their
casebook with the comment: "So much emphasis is currently placed upon avoidance
of improper argument that it seems amiss not to r emind today's young lawyer of his
duty of effective representatioh his client in an adversary system."110 Similarly,
one of the most highly regarded of American jurists, Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor
of the California Supreme Court,111 cited Lord Erskine's defiance of the court to
illustrate the attorney's "duty to protect the interests of his client" and his "right to
press legitimate argument and to protest an' erroneous ruling." 112
•

of

Recall, too, Lord Brougham's classic graymail threat, quoted at the beginning of
this chapter. It came during his opening statement in the trial of Queen Caroline for
adilltery. According to Fraser, Lord Brougham's opening was· "a masterly'performance."113 As he finished, "the aged Lord ErsKine, fonner Lord Chancellor, [was so
moved that he] rushed from the chamber in tears." 114 Another barrister declared
that Lord· Brougham's opening statement was "one of the most powerful orations
that ever proceeded'from human lips."11s •
Although Brougham's client, Queen Caroline, was undoubtedly guilty as charged
(and was widely believed to be guilty), she' was ultimately exonerated. Nor was
107

JoHN LoRD C.uJJ>BELL, LIVES OF THE LoRD C HANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND,

vol. VIII, 277 (1857) (small capitals in the original).
108 EDwARD MA!uoR1BANXS, FoR THE DEFENSE:

THE LlFE or StR EDWARD MARsHALL

109

HALL 45

(1931).

The full episode is recorded in CAMPBELL,, supra note 107, at vol. VIII, 272--79.
HAzARD, CASES AND MATERIAL ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND
FEDERAL (2d ed. 1968).
111 Chief Justice Traynor was Chairman of the Special Committee that drafted the ABA Code of
"
Judicial Conduct (1972).
2
oll Gallagher v. Municipai CoUrt of Los Angeles, 192 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1948).
110 DAVID LouiSELL & GEOFFREY C.

'l.l3

FRASER, THE UNRULY QUEEN: THE

114

!d.

115

Id.

LIFE OF,Qul:EN.CAROLINE

433 (1996).
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everyone favorably impressed with Brougham's performance. Lord Chancellor
Eldon later "rebuked Brougham most weightily for his threats to the House"116 that is, for what Eldon saw as Brougham's overzealousness on behalf of his client.
Nevertheless, Brougham was ''the hero of the hour,"117 and he subsequently
succeeded .Eldon as Lord Chancellor of England. 118
New York lawyer Barry Slotnick provides another version of Hall and Erskine's
insistence on zealous representation. Slotnick was representing Bernard Goetz, a
white vigilante who had shot three young black men who had been harassing him
on a subway. The judge admonished Slotnick, first in front of the jury and later at
a bench .conference, for asking questions that included facts that were not
supported by the evidence. The following colloquy then occurred at the bench after
the prosecutor's objection to another question:
Slotnick: Judge, you can speak a little louder and the jury can hear you.
Judge: I'm upset with your conduct.
Slotnick: I'm upset with your conduct.
Judge: You know where you can go with that.
But Mr. Slotnick continued arguing and eventually the judge came around to
Slotnick's position, and permitted him to ask the question.119
Consistent with this tradition of zealous representation, a lawyer cannot
constitutionally be held in contempt of court so long as she does not create an
obstruction that "blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty."120 As
Professor Louis Raveson has found, "l'he opinions reveal repeated caution that a
judge's overreaction to the unavoidable contentiousness of trial advocijcy - the
confusion of'offenses to their sensibilities' with 'obstruction to the administration of
justice' - does not define contempt."12t
Unquestionably, however, a judge must be able to protect against "actual
obstruction," either in the courtroom or so nearby as "actually to obstruct
justice."122 Moreover,'obstruction can include deliberately frustrating a legitimate
ruling of the court, as by putting information before a jury that the judge has ruled
inadmissible.123
''Actual obstruction" did not occur, however, when counsel, having been ordered

116

I d. at 438.
I d. at 448.
118
Id. at 465.
119 E.R Shipp, A Tenacicus Slctnick Faces Biggest Test, N.Y. Tnu:s, May 16, 1987, at 33, 36.
120 In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962).
·
121 Raveson, supra note 97, at 514.
122
In re McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236.
123
Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949). But cf. People v. Romanski, 507 N.E.2d 887 (ID. App.), cert.
denied, 116 m. 2d 572 (1987) (''Romanski's remarks constituted a good faith attempt to represent his
client and cannot fairly be seen as a violation of the court's order."); Inre Sulliivan, 586 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992).
117
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to stop asking questions, replied: "[W]e have a right to ask the questions, and we
propose to do so unless some bailiff stops us."124 In that case the Supreme Court
held that it is "essential to a'fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to
make•honest good-faith efforts to present their clients' cases."125 The Court added
that "[a]n independent judiciary and a vigorous, independent bar are both
indispe~able parts of om· system of justice."tze

§ 4.07
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The problem is not that too many lawyers are publicly criticizing judges.
Unfortunately, too few lawyers are willing to do so, even when a judge has
committed serious ethical violations and should be held accountable, and even
though lawyers have a "special responsibility for the quality of justice!'128
Model Rule 8.3(b) requires a lawyer to volunteer knowledge about serious
violations of judicial ethics to the appropriate authority.129 In other words, a lawyer
has an ethical duty to report judicial misconduct and failing to do so could face
disciplinary charges. With regard to public criticism of judges, MR 8.2(a) forbids a
lawyer to make a statement about a judge that the lawyer "knows to be false or with
reckless ·disregard as to its truth or falsity." That is, lawyers are properly subject to
a New York Times u Sullivan130 "actual malice" standard in their public criticism
of judges.
Lawyers, of course, are particularly knowledgeable about judges' conduct, and
are therefore in a 'position to inform the public about abuses of judicial power.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has held, judges are not "anointed priests,"
entitled'to special protection from the "public clamor'' of democratic s6ciety.131 The
law gives judges and the institutional reputation of courts "no greater immunity
from criticism than other persons or institutions." Judges, after all, are not ''flabby
creatures."132 Rather, they. are expected to be "[people] of fortitude, able to thrive
in, a ~a,rdy ~ma~." 133 Thus, we have a practice, "familiar in the long history of
Anglo-American litigation, whereby unsuccessful . . . lawyers give vent to their

124

In re McCcm:neU, 370 U.S. at 235.

125

ld.
l d.

126
127

This topic is relevant to zealous representation because effective representation of the client may
require the lawyer to criticize the conduct of a judge. Also, a lawyet· may be required to report seriously
unethical conduct by a judge even though the lawyer might be justifiably concerned that the judge might
retaliate by rulings that are contrary to the interests of future clients.
128
MoDEL RULES OF PRoF'L CoNDUCT pmbl.: A J;.a'yyer's Responsibilities (1983).
129
New York does require a lawyer to reveal knowledge of judicial misconduct, but only, "upon proper
request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon" the conduct of judges. DR
l-10S(B).
130
131
132

133

876 u.s. 254 (1964).
Lfmdmark Communications, Inc. v. Vtrginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978).
United Sta~s y. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
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disappointment in·tavern or press."134
Consider, then, the following cases:
Case One. The judge's opinion is "irrational" and 11cannot be taken
seriously."
Case Two. "This judge sitting on the bench is a danger to the people of this
city."
Case Three. "I have had more than enough of judicial opinions that . . .
falsify the facts of the cases that have been argued, . . . that make
disjngenuous use or omission of material authorities, . . . that cover up
thes,e things."
Case Four. The state's appellate judges are "whores who became madams.
I would like to [be a judge]. . . . But the only way you can get it is to be
in politics or buy it - and I don't even know the going price!'
Case Five. The judge's decision is "overt racism," and the defendants "have
no more chance of having a fair hearing in front of [the judge] than they
would being judged by the Ku Klux Klan."

..,

Case Six. The judge is "dishonest," "ignorant," a "l?uffoon," a ''bully,"
"drunk on the bench," and shows "evidence of anti-Semitism."
Do any of those criticisms warrant professional discipline of. the lawyer?
The quotation in Case One will be familiar to most rea<ters as what passes for
civil discourse among Supreme Court Justices. The particular quotatibn (''irrational," "cannot 'be taken seriously'') was directed against Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor by Justice Antonia Scalia.135 No professional disciplinary action has been
reported against Scalia, or any other justice, for these or other uncivil remarks. 136
The second quotation (the judge iS a "danger to the people") is a Criticism of a
New York City criminal court judge by then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.137 It is similar
to other remarks about the judge by then Governor George Pataki (also a
lawyer).138 The Mayor and Governor were ~tigating the judge on the basis of two
decisions. Similarly, former New York criminal court judge Harold Rothwax used to
tell his students at Columbia Law School, "The court of appeals is in session; we are
all in danger."139 Further ridiculing the administration of justice, Rothwax wrote
that a jury trial is a "crapshoot"140 and that New York's highest court is a
134

Morgan. s1s u.s. at 421.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 536, (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1
aa See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Jtul:icial
Civility, 28 VAL. u. L. REV. 583 (1994).
137 MayO'T' P'l'flsses Ouster ofAbuse Case Judge, N.Y. Tnr.tls, Feb. 17, 1996, atA29.'
1 " Don Van Natta, Judge Rebuked Afte'r a Woman Is SW.in, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1996, at BS.
139 HARoLD J. RonrwAX, G urLTY 31 (1996). Not everyone finds Judge Rothwax's commentaries to be
either amusing or accurate. See. e.g., Steven Duke, Crime and P1tnishnumt, N.Y. TIMEs Boor RmBW,
Mar. 31, 1996, at 8 (The book is "deeply misleading about the system as a whole.'').
135

140

Id. at 162.
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"lottery."141 No professional disciplinary action was ever reported against Giuliani,
Pataki, or Rothwax for these public attacks on judges and the jqdicial system.142
The it;ttemperate and broad-scale attack on the integrity of judges in Case Three
(complaining that judges too often falsify facts and use authorities dishonestly) is
from a talk that Freedman gave to the Judicial Conference for the Federal
Circuit. 143 Fortunately, no disciplinary action was taken on that occasion.
Case Four ("whores," "madams,'' and the going price for a judgeship) is from a
Life magazine article about a New York pubpc defender named 'Martin Erdmann.
Erdmann was subjected to disciplinary proceedings and censured for his comments,
but the discipline was reversed by the New Yo1·k Court of Appeals. 144 Yet, as pointed
out by a dissenting judge, Erdmann's comments had been published in a magazine
with a circulation of several million copies, and "[i)t is difficult to r ead the article
. . . without coming to the conclusion· that neither the legal system nor the legal
profession possesses integrity."145 Neverthele ss, New York's highest court held that
"isola~d instance!> of disrespect for the law, judges, and courts expressed by vulgar
and insulting words or other incivility . . . committed oytside the precincts of a
court are not subject to professional discipline."146 "Nor is the matter substantially
altered,'' the court added, ''if there is' hyperbole expressed in the impoverished
vocabulary of the streets."147
The quotation in Case Five (comparing the judge to the Ku Klux Klan) was by
criminal defense lawyer Ronald L. Kuby. The disciplinary committee dismissed a
complaint against Kuby, and the United States District Gourt for the District of
Connecticu( affirmed. The court said that Kuby's statement "concerning a highly
respected judge . . . was, to be charitable, intemperate, incivil and immature. It was
not, however, actionable under the Disciplinary Rules . . . and First Amendment
jurisprudence:'148
The charge inI Case Six ("dishot:J.est," ''buffoon," "drunk,'' • and so on) resulted,
initially, in suspension of the lawy~r from practice before the feder al district court
for two years. The grounds were that the criminal defense lawyer, Stephen Yagrnan,
had violated local rules forbidding a lawyer to engage in conduct that "degrades or
impugns the integrity of the Court" and that ''interferes with the administration of
justice." But that disciplinary action was re':ersed in an opinion by fede1·al appeals

141

I d. at 31.
See Monroe Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges - A
Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HoFSTRA L. REV. 729 (1997) (arguing that judicial
independence is not threatened by criticism of judges by practicing lawyers, but by public officials, who
have the power to affect the judges' cafeers).
143
128 F.R.D. 437, 439 (1990); see a.lso Monroe Freedman, When Judges Tamper with the Evidence,
L EGAL Tu.IEs, Nov. 19, 1990, at 22.
1 44
Justices of Appellate Div., First Dep't v. Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1973).
1 45
Id. at 428.
1415
/d. at 426.
147 Id.
142

148

In re Ronald L. Kuby, G.P.-86-10, Order dated Aug. 18, 1993.
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'Bound by pri_or authority in the Ninth.•Circuit, Judge Kozinski was no~ able to
apply Nw, York Times v Sullivan. 150 The New York Times "actual mali~e'' standard
pro~c~ ev~.n false charges agaiQst a public official unless mp.(le wit~ knowl~dge of
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. AB applied by the Ninth Circuit in
disciplinary cases against lawyers, however , reckles~mess is determined objectively,
by reference to the kind of investigation that wo.hd be made by "a reasonable
attorney, considered in the light of all his professional functions . . . in the same or
similar circumstances.'' The court's inquiry focuses on whether the attorney ·had a
"reasonable factual basis for making the statements, considering their nature and
the context in which they were made," including whether the attorney ''pursued
readily available avenues of investigation." Truth is, of course, an absolute defense,
and the burden of proving falsity is on the disciplinary committee.m

AB Judge Kozinski noted, that standard is consistent with cases like In re
Holtzman. 152 There, then Queens District Attorney· Elizabeth Holtzman was
reprimanded for issuing a press release that falsely accused·a judge of requiringt he
victim of a sexual assault to demonstrate the position she had been in at the' time of
the assault. Before making her charges public, Holtzman had not obtained the
minutes of the proceedings, had not made any effo1t to speak to court offiG.ers, the
court reporter, defense counsel, or any other person present during the alleged
misconduct, including the trial assistant in her office who had originally reported it.
Thus, she had been reckless in not ''pursu[ing] readily available avenues of
investigation" before making false charges against the judge. 153
Unlike allegations of fact,. opinions are not subject to proof or disproof. This
means, Judge Kozinski noted, that an exp_ression of opinion (like an allegation of
intellectual dishonesty, or being the worst judge on the bench) can~ot be punished
unless it implies a false asserti<;m of fact.1 54 "[I]f it is plain that the speaker is
expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise,
rather than claiming to be in possession 'Of objectively verifiable facts, the statement
is not actionable." 15 s
149

Standing Conun. on Discipline of the United States Dist. Court v. Yagman, 55 F.Sd 1480 (9th Cir.

1995).
150
15 1

376 u.s. 254 (1964).
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-38.

152

577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991).
'Holtzman's lawyer, Norman Redlich, has noted, however, that she acted only after she had a
sworn statement from the prosecutor who had been present at the hearing. Letter from Norman Redlich
to Mom·oe Freedman (Apr. 19, 1996). This fact does not appear in the court's oppuon. ~ee Case Three,
153

supra.
154
With regard to anti-Semitism, Yagman had' said that the judge "has 'a penchant for sanctioning
J ewish lawyers: me, David Kenner and Hugh Manes'.-'I find this tO be evidence of apti-Semitism."
In rejecting the charge against Yagman or this count; Kozinski r elied in part on the RESrATEMENT
(Seco~o) OF 'ThRTS § 566 cmt. e: "A simple expression of opinion baseq on disclgsed .. . nondefamatory
fac~ is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the
opinion may be Ol' bow derogatory it is:"
155 Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441 (quoting Haynes -u Alft~A Knopf, Inc.).
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Yagman's statement that the judge had been "drunk on the bench," however,
"could be interpreted as suggesting that [the judge] had actually, on at least one
occasion, taken the bench whil~ intOxicated." It thetefore implies facts that are
capable of objective veffiication.JM However, the committee presenting disciplinary
chargl!s against Yagman had the burden to prove thE! falsity ofYagman's statement
about the judge's dronUenness, and it failed to present any evidence at all on that
issue. Accordingly, Yagman could not be disciplined for that statement either.1 57
ll'hose who argue that.lawyers are entitled to less freedom of speech than other
citizens rely principally on two Supreme Court decisions. One case, FloridO, Bar u
Went for ·lt, 158 .involved solicitation of clients, which is commercial speech, and
therefore r eceives only "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in..the scale . of First Amendment values."159 By contrast,
criticism of a public official is core First Amendment speech. ·
The other Supreme Court case limiting lawyer's speech is Gentile tt State Bar of
Nevada. 160 The five-member majority there emphasized that the case involved not
only, speech, but the cohfticting right to a fair trial. In that context, the majority
held: ''The regulation of attorneys' speech is limited -it applies only to speech that
is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect [on a fair trial]."un
Judge Koiinslq concluded his opinion in Yagman with a quotation from Justice
Hugo Black:102

..

The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism v.crongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a prize~ American privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always witn perfect good taste, on aU public institutions, And
an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the
dignity 'of tl}e bench/woUld probably engender resentment, suspicion, and
contempt much more than it would enhance respect.
..,

..

Like ·Justice Scalia1 Judge Rbthwax, G$>vernor Pataki, and Mayor Giuliani,
therefore, lawyers in general do not forfeit their First Amendment rights when they
become members of the bar.1 &3

lM

ld. at 1441.

157

Id. at 1441-42.
515 u.s. 618 (1995).
Id. at 623; see Chapter 10, infra.
501 u.s. 1030 (1991).
Id. at 1075.
Bridges V. cailrorni.a, 314 u.s. 252, 270-71 (1941).

158
159
160

161
162
163

Nor do judges forfeit their right to respQnd to public criticism of themselves or each other,
although it is frequen~y said that ~ey are forbfdd~n to do sq. In fact, Rule 2.10~), of the ABA Model
Code of J udicial Conduct (2007), expressly recognizes the propriety of a judge's response "in·the media
or elsewhere" to allegations concerning the judge's conduct in a matter. The pertinent limitation on a
judge's response is that the judge "shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be
expected to af!'ect the outcome· or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court."
Rule 2.10(A). See also Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Mark !.'Harrison & Keith Swisher,
When Judges Should Be Seen, Not Heard: Extrajudicial Comments Co·ncerning Pending Cases and the
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FRIVOLOUS ARGUMENTS

Lawyers are generally familiar with the ethical rule forbidding f'rhrolous. arguments,164 principally because of sanctions'imposed under rules of civil procedure for
making such argument.s.165 Not all lawyers are aware, however, of two ways in
which th~ prolubitions of frivolous arguments are restlicted in· both the rules
themselves and in their enforcement. First, the term "flivolous" is narrowed by the
way it is defined and explained in the ethic-al rules and in cow·t decisions. Second,
the ethical rules have express limitations with respect to arguments made on behalf
of criminal defendants,14115 and courts are generally loath to sanction c1iminal
defenselawyers.
· ·

[1]

Sanctions in Civil Cases Under Rule 11 and Similar ·
Rules

During the decade after the 1983 amE:m~ents to Rule 11 of th~ F~~~~ Rul~s
of Civil Procedure, a dangerous tendency developed to impose s~vere ~anc.tions
against lawyers under various federal and stat;e rules.m This ffifCes.sive use of
sanctions for allegedly frivolou~ filings prior to the 1993 amendme,nt of Rule 11 has
left a misleadingly broad impression of the meaning of "frivolous."
Rule 11 is similar to the ethical codes (discussed below) in permitting a ·claim or
defense that is ''warranted by existing law or by a• norurivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing ne1i.J law."168
Giving added emphasis to the italicized language, the Advisory Committee's Notes
to the 1983 version of Rule 11 cautioned that the rule is "not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." 169
Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that creativity has been chilled by
Controversial Self-Defense Exception in tM New Code of Judicial Conduct, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.
559 (2009).
In a highly publicized 1996 case, President Bill Clinton, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, and
members of Congress attacked United States District Court judge Harold Baer, threatening him with
impeachment because of his decision to suppress evidence in a drug case. In response to those attaCks,
and while the proceeding was still pending before J udge Baer, the Chief Judge and three other judges
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals published a defense of the judge. Referring to Canon 3B(9) of the
1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the judges said: "[T]he Code also places on judges an affirmative
liuty to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. In this instance, we believe our duty
under this latter provision overrides whatever indirect comment on a pending case might be inferred
from this statement (and we intend none)." Don VanNatta, Judges Defend a CoUeague from Attacks, N.Y.
Tnm,.Mar. 29, 1996, at Bl. Nevertheless, in response to the criticism, J udge Baer reversed the decision.
See Monroe H. Freedman, The Threa.J, to Judicial Independence lry Critiwm of Judges - A Proposed
§ol'!dion to the Real Problen~. 25 HoFSTRA L. Rtv. 729 (1997).
164
MR 3.1; ALI RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF THE LAw GoVERNING LAWYERS§ 110.
165
E.g. , FEo. R. Cw. P. 11; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (applying to all proceedings), and FED. R. APP.
P. 38 (applying to all appeals). See ge?wraUy GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAw oF
LITIGATION ABusE (3d ed. 2004?; Supp. 2003).
·
166 See MR 3.1 cmt. [3]; R ESTATEMENT § 110 cmt. f.
167 See, e.g., FED. R. CJV. P. 11; Fso. R. Al'P. P. 38, 46; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927.
168
Emphasis added.
16
~ 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
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sanctions under Rule 11. In addition, judicial enforcement of the rule has had a
disproportionate mwact on plaintiffs' attorneys in civil rights cases, impaired
lawyer-client confidentiality, and cause'd serious conflicts of interest betWeen
•
•
lawyers and clients.17 0
In an important article, "Rule.ll in the Real World," Mark Stein exp}ained, from
his experience as a litigator,· that lawyers were most inclined to threaten sanctions
when an adversary's position is "not frivolous, but [rather, when it] is
simultaneously da{lgerous and vulnerable."171 That is, the unwarranted charge that
an argument is jrivolous has been .used to distract the court from the merits of the
argument. Moreover, even if the adversary lawyer is aware that his position is
meritorious, "he may still be cowed by the threat of sanctions because of the
unpredit;WJ>le way Jn which courts award them."1' 2
In response to broad criticism of the 1983 version of Rule 1!, the rule was
amended in 1993.173 Since then, the volume of cases involving charges of frivolous
filings hds 'been substantially reduced. However, the reason for that decrease is not
clear. One rehson could be that the amendment made imposition of sanctions
disCJ;:etionarY Wi~h the judge, rather than mandatory, and an order· imposing
sanctions ·must..desciibe the sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the
sanction. Another possible reason is that a motion for sanctions can no longer be
simply an afterthought to another motion (e.g., a motion for summary judgment),
but m,QSt ~·lJlade and supported in a sepro-ate pleading. Also, the 1993 Rule 11 has
a •"saf~ hai·bor" provision, under which a lawyer whose filing is challenged as
friyo}pils. bas .twenty-one days to withdraw the filing without sanction. In one
170
See STEPHEN B. ·BuRBANK, RuLE 11 IN TRANsiTION: THE REPORT OF THE TfllRD CIRCUIT TAsK FoRcE oN
FEDERAL RULE OF CML PROCEDURE 11 (1989); GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANcrlONS: Tm: FEDERAL LAW OF
LITIGATIONS ABUSE (2d ed. 1994); JEROLD s. SoLOVY ET AL., SANCTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CML
PROCEDURE 11 (1996); THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RuLE 11 SANCTIONING PROC?SS (1988)j George Cochran,
R'UW 11: The Road to AmendtMnt, 61 Mlss. L.J. 5 (1991); Development$ in the Law- Lawyers'
Responsilnlities and Lawyers'Responses, 107 H.A.Rv. L. RBV. 1547, 1642-1644 (More than twenty percent
of lawyers interviewed "did n~~ assert a potentially meritorious claim"); Melissa Nelken, SanctiOns
Under Amended Federal R'UW 11: SO'I'M "Chilling'' Problems in the Struggle Between Comp&~~,Sation
and Punishment:' 74 Gro. L.J. 1313 (1986); Paul Rothstein & Richard WoHe, Innovative Attorneys
Starting to Feel·ChiU from New Rule 11, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1978, at 18; Carl B. Rubin & Laura
Ringenbach, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Federp,l Rules of Evidence, 137 F:R.D. 53, 64 (1991) ; Jeffrey M. Stempel, Santions, Sym'I'Mtry. and
Safe HarlxJrs: Limiting Misapplication of R'UW 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dilnnissal
Devices, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. 257, 259 (1991) (Rule 11 "discouraged innovative lawyering"); Georgene M.
Vairo, Rul6 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 483-86 (1991) (Rule 11
is being used to cbill plaintiffs' access to courts).
171 Mark S. Stein, Rule IJ in the Reca World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the Purpose
ofImposing Attorney Fee Sanctionsfw the Assemon of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132 F.R.D. 309, 313
(1990). Another lawyer has• commented that sanctions are not needed for claims that are truly frivolous,
because ·~re pas always been a sanction fQr frivol~us claims - it's called losing." Another lawyer has
observed that "good judges don't need Rule 11, and·bad judges shouldn't have it."
172 ld.

See JosEPH, supra note 170, at 21~. The FRCP was amended again in 2007 "as'part of the
general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood." According to the Committee
notes, the changes to Rule 11 were "intended to be stylistic only." The proposed change& were approved
by the Supreme Court in April 2007. The current version of the FRCP includes revisions that took efl'ect
in 2009.
173
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respect, this ·~safe-harbor" can be a potent threat, ....coercing withdrawal of
arguments that Stein characterizes as "not frivolous, but . . . simultaneously
dangerous and vuln~rable." 174 A positive effect of the safe-harbor amendment,
however, is that a motion for sanctions cannot be filed at t he end of litigation,
because at that point it is no longer possible to make use of the safe-harbor
withdrawal.
There is still reason for concern, therefore, that Rule 11, and similar rules in
state courts, are continuing' to have a deleterious effect on creative lawyering in
civil cas~. This is so in part because of th~ abuse of the rule by some judge's,
especially prior to the 1993 amendments, ahd because of the continuing in terrorem
effect of possible sanctions under Rule 11 and similar rules. Nevertheless, the
reduction in Rule 11 sanctions in federal courts since 1993 is a good sign.

[2]

Defining "Frivolous"

Despite the' abuses under Rule 11 and similar rules, the definition of "friVolous"
has been an extremely narrow one. The traditional legal definition of frivolous is
"obviously false·on the face of the pleading," as when ~omething waSt pleaded that
"conflicted with a judicially noticeable fact or was logically impossible, such as a
plea of judgment recovered before th'e accrual of the cause of action."175 Surely, a
lawyer could prqperly be subjected to sanctions for filing a pleading that is
frivolous in the sense of being "obviously false on [its] face." Moreover, lawyers can
pt;operly be punish~d for filing or maintaining pleadings that are "sham" or
"baseless,'' that is, those that appear to state proper claims or defenses, but that
are known to the lawyer to be fafse infact. 176
The Supreme Court has gone somewhat further, by unanimously defining a
"frivolous" claim as one based on an'1'ihl:lisputably meritless" or "outlandish" legal
theory, or one whose factual contentions are "clearly baseless," such as a claim
describing "fantastic or delusional scenarios."117 Elaborating on that definition, the
Court held that frivolousness can be found when the facts alleged ''rise to the level
of the irrat\onal or the wholly incredible."t 7 a
In addition to establishing this highly restrictive definition, the Supreme Court
has cautioned judges against finding arguments to be frivolous. "Some improbable
allegations might properly be disposed of on summary judgment,'' the C.ourt
explained, ''but to dismiss them as frivolous without any factual development is to
disregard the age-old insight that many a)legations might be 'strange, but true; for
truth is always strange, Stranger than fiction.' " 179

174

Supra note 171.

Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enf~ Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rttle of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MniN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1976).
175

176

171

Id. at 26-29.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 32'7-28 (1989) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1948)):
Denton v. Hemandez,.504 U.S. 25,33 (1992).
179 Id. at 33 (quoting LORD BYRoN, DoN J uAN, Canto XIV, stanza 101 (Truman Steffan, Esther
Steffand, & Willis Pratt eds., 1977)).
178
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The Chilling Effect of Sanctions on, Creative Lawyering

Some judges have tended to ignore the narrow definition 9f what constitutes a
frivolous argum~t, and have imposed sanctions against lawyers who file pleadings
or make arguments that have proven to be unavailing. When that happens, zealous
advocacy is not the only value that is placed at risk. The genius of our common law
is also jeopardized.
For example, Justice Cardozo noted that nine out of ten cases taken to the New
Yprk Court of Appeals during his time on that bench were '"predetennin~d," their
fate "preestablished" by "iqevitable laws" from the moment of tpeir filing.
MacP4erson tt BuU;k Motor Co. appears to be a perfect example. 1 ~ In 1908, the
Court of Appea}s of New York had reaffirmed the long-established rule that a
consumer cannot r ecover against the manufacturer of a product for negligence.181
Not long thereafter, MacPherson, who had been injured while driving a car with a
defective wheel, sued the Buick Motor Company for negligent mamifacture. Surely,
MacPh~rson's cas.e wa,s one of those that. Cardozo called ''predetermined!'182 The
r_!:lsult of MacPherson:s appeal, however, was Cardozo's most celebrated torts
opinion, reversing long-established law by allowing a consumer to sue a
m~ijuf.acturer for a defective product, and demonsti:ating the creative common-law
· judging for which he has been so highly regarded.183

As Professor Grant Gilmore observed, the MacPJwrson de'cision "impos!'ld
liability on [a -defendant] who would almost certainly ... not have been liab}({ if
anyone but CardoZo had been stating and analyzing' the prior case law."184 At the
time of filing the complaint, however, MacPherson's lawyer could not have known
that Cardozo would choose to reverse a century unbroken precedent that had
only recently been r eaffirmed. Much less could he have known that Cardozo would
be able to carry a majority of the court with him. Without that frivolous-appearing
complaint, however, Cardozo could not have changed the common }aw of
manufacturer's liability as he did.

of

Even Cardozo, the great innovator, obserVed that ''the range of free activity for
judges is relatively small,"185 in part because judges are· limited· to the issues that
are brought before them by counsel. Behind every innovatiye judge1 there(ore, is a
lawyer whose creative (and, arguably, f1"iyolous) litigating ppened up .that. small
range of judicial opportunity, thereby making the precedent-shattering decision
possible.
Innovative judging (and lawyering) is not restricted to common law cases.
Depending on how one counts the cases, the Supreme Court has ove1TUled its own
decisions hundreds of times. On at least sixteen occasions, this has happened
180

217 N.Y. 382 (1916).

181 'lbrgesen v .

Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156 (1908).

182

The point is underscored by Cadillac Motor Cm· Co. v. J ohnson, 221 F. 801 (2d Cu·. 1915).

183

See G.

184

GRANT GILMORE, THE A GES OF AMERICAN

EDWARD

WHITE, 'lbRT LAw IN Am:~ICA 210 (1980).
LAw 75 (1977), giloted t'n WHITE, 'IbRT L Aw IN AMERICA 120

(1980).
185 BENJA1>DN CARDOZO,

THE GROWI"H

OF THE

LAW 60 (1924).
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within thtee years.1 88 At other times, the most venerable of precedents hAve fallen,
including at least ten cases that were overruled after as'many as 94 to 126 years. 187
For example, in Erie Railroad u Tompkins, 1 aa the Supreme Court overruled a
precedent that had been applied every day in every federal trial court·fot nearly a
century.189 On the occasion of one about-face by the Court, Justice- 0wen Roberts
protested that "[n]ot a fact differentiates [the overruled casej from this [one]
except the names .of the parties."•~ Inpe~d, the majority itself acknowledg~9 in
that case, "The Distri~ ~urt denied the relief sought an(i the Circuit yoJirt ,Qf
Ap,peals quite properly affirmed its action on t~~ authority ofr·Grovey u Tpwnsend,"
which the Cqurt the~ proceeded to overrule. 191
The Rehnquist Court overruled prior' authority in over fo~ty case's. 192 For
example, in La~nce v. Texas, 193 the. Cowt struck do~ state legislatioq. outla)ving
private, consensuat 1\omosexual cohdutt. In tloing so, the Court overthbied Bowers
v, Hardwiclf, 1 ~ decidj::d seveuwen yejU's.before. In Bowers, ;;l majority of the Cowt
had descnbed the leg,al ¥gument ~pat ultimate!Jwrev~iled in, Lawrence as "at be~_h
facetioq.s." 1~ Sinc,e .th~ dictionary definitiq,Q of "facetious" is "npt meant.Y>. b~.,taken
seriou.sly or literally:·•~ the Courl was characterizing, that argument in a ~a:v. th.at
was perhaps even more pejorative than the wopd "frivolous."
.1

..

.:

...

•

•

•

I

l~ose v. Himley (decided, 1808; overruled, 1810); Kansas Pac. R. C.o. v. Prescott (decided, 18~;
ovemu'ed in part, 1874); Harsh\nan \r, Bates (decided, 1S75; overruled, 187'1); Jones v. Opelika (decide'd,
1942;J ovettuled,•· 194S)r Minersville District v. Gobitis' (decided, 1940; overruled, 1~43); Hti.st v.
Moore-McGonnack Lines (decided, 1946; ov~rruled, 1949); Trupiano> V, U.S./Mc:Donald v.1U.S. (decided,
1948; overruled, l,9SP; Kinse~la v. Krueger/Reid v. Covert.(decided:•l~5~,;<?venjiied, 1~5~); L,adnep. U.S.
(decided, 19~; oven'Uled, 1958); Kesler v. Dept. of Pu9Jic Safety (q~ci9ed,::-1~~2; overruled, 1965);
Rehabilitation Services v. Zarate (decided,, 1972; overruled, 1974); Stere~ '<Mothe~· ~;Children's
Rights Organization (decided 1972;'ovetTJ!ed,'1974); Fuentes v. Stevin {decided; 1972; overrured, 1974);
Bonelli Cattle v. Arizona (decided, 1973; overruled 1976); U.S. v. J.enkins (d~ded, 1975; ove,r.ru}ed, 1978);
South Carolina v. Gathers (decided, 1989; overruled, 1991).
187
•
•'
_.,,
• l
Stein v. Bowman (decided, 1839; overruled In part, 1933); SWift v.,:!)'son (deciaed,.J?,42; overruled,
1938); Schooner Catherine v. Dickirlson (deci~ed, 1854; overrpled, 1975)~ Pennbyer v. Neff (decided, 1878;
overruled, 1977); Rolston v. Missouri Fund Gomm'rs (decided; 1887; o\retruled in pari,' 1984); 'Coffey v.
U.S. (decided, 1886; overruled, 1984); Ex Parte Bain (decided, 1887; overruled in part, 1985); Kentucky
v. Dennison (decided, 1861; oven'Uled, 1987); Kring v. Missouri (decided, 1883; overruled, 1990); E'» Parte
Bain (decided 1887; overruled, 1985).
188 304 U.S. f}4, 11 Ohio Op. 246 (1938).
189 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)..
190 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (citing Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
Ul&

191

I d. at 652.
THE CoNSTITUTIONOF THE UNITED STATES OF .AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND lNTERl'RETATIOI'I 2245-56 (Johnny
H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996); id. at 171 (2000 Supp.); L. E PSTEIN, J.A. SEGAL, H.J. SPAETH
& T.G. WALKER, THE SuPREME CoURT CoMPENDIUM 194-206 (3d ed. 2002); Maj(')f Decisions of the Court,
179Q-f&Q02; CoNGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 87-141.
193 589 u.s. 558 (2003).
194
478 u.s. 186 (1986).
195
ld. at 194.
198
WEBSTEll'S CoLLEGE DICTIONARY (1991).
192
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T}le Roberts Court has not been reluctant to reverse •precedent, though
sometimes the Court is less than candid about the reversal. 1117 Tom Goldstein,
founder of SCCXI'USblog, has called this the "John Roberts Method."·m Goldstein
belieyes that the Roberts Court is "moving steadily in the direction of rolling back
Warren Co~ra precedents that conservatives view as significant overreaching of
the judicial role."J99
The Court has candidly acknowledged that its precedents are "not
sacroSanct."200 In Ring -u Arizona, a case that overturned a twelve-J.ear-old
Supreme Court case ailoWing a judge to make a requisite finding of fact underlying
a death sentence, Justice Scalia remarked, "I have acquired new wisdom . . . or, to
put i~ more critically, have discarded old ignorance."2ol

[4]

Frivolous Arguments Under the Model Rules

Recognizing how creative lawyering can dispel "old ignorance" and il'n.Part "new
wisdom" to judges, the American Bar Association has taken care in its ethical rules
not fu discourage lawyers from challenging established precedent or otherwise
seeking 'to make new law on behalf of their clients. F or example, Model Rule 3.1
provides t hat "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous." Under such a r ule, of course, MacPherson's lawyer would be subject to
professional discipline, along with countless other lawyers whose creative litigating
helped to sh~pe our law. However, a contention ~ not frivolous within the rule if it
i,s,made as "il good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.'' Also, the Comment notes that "the law is not always clear and never
is static.'' According-ly, ''in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must
be taken of the laW's ambiguities and potential for change." Moreover, .filihg an
action or defense is not frivolous under the Model Rules "even though the lawyer
believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail."
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers has almost identical language
to the Mpdel Rules.202 In addition, the Comment to ~ection 110 urges judges to
exerc\se .restraint in disciplining lawyers for frivolous advocacy,, noting that
"[a]pmin1stt:ation and interpretation of prohibitions against frivolous litigation
should be .tempered by concern to avoid over-enforcement"203

See Charlie Savage, Respecting Precedmt, or Settled La~q Un/e$s It's Not Settled, N.Y. TiMES,
J uly 15, 2009 (noting that J ustice AQtonin Scalia has accused Chief Justice John G. RobertS Jr. of
exercising "faux judicial restraint" by hollowing out precedents while technically not overruling them).
198 Tom Goldstein, The John Roberts Method, T BE NEw REPUBUC, June 30, 2009, available at
httpfwww. tnr.comlpoliti~e/story.htrnl?id=8a2b426a7l77_475d_6825-ad393652e9cf.
199 Id. .
197

200

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002).

201 536 U.S. at 611.
202 See R ESTATEMENT § 110 (1) (''A lawyer may not bring or defend a proceeding or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which f.n'cludes a good-faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.").
203 R ESTATEMENT § 110 cmt. b.
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Constitutional Limits on Sanctions for Frivolous· Law
Suits

Moreover, judges who have imposed sanctions against lawyers have typically
ignored the constitutional limitations on sanctioning lawyers for .filiiig frivolous
pleadings.204 As the Supreme Court has reiterated in Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. u Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 205 there is a First
~endment right to petition for redr ess of grievances by ptigating civil cases. That
rigJit has, of course, been purposefully chilled by sanctions intended to discourage
litigation.
A "sham" lawsuit is an exception to the constitutional right to petition through
the courts. However, the "sham" exception does not apply unless the suit is
"objectively baseless" or "objectively meritless."206 To Sl!.tisfy that test, the
litigation must be "so baseless that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
to secure favorable relief."207 All that is necessary to establish the constitutional
rlght is an objective "chance" that a claim "may'' be held valid.208 In that event, the
First Amendment right is secure, even if the litigant has no subjective expectation
of success and has a malicious motive for pursuing the claim.209

[6]

The Rarity of Sanctions for Frivolous Arguments ip
Criminal Cases

Criminal defense lawyers are rarely disciplined or otherwise sanctioned for
asserting frivolous positions in advocacy. 210 One reason is that criminal defense is
different from other types of advocacy. As stated in the ~omment to Model Rule 3.1,
which relates to frivolous arguments: "The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are
subordinate to federal or state constitutiopal law that entitles a, defendant in a
criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or c.ontention that
otherwise would be prohibited by the Rule.'' 211
Also, a comment in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers notes that
while the section on frivqlous arguments applies "generally" to criminal defense
lawyers, they may nevertheless take "any step" that is either ''required or
permitted" by the constitutional guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel. 212
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sq,ncticrns in t~ Proppsed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Powe~·, 11 HoFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983); discussion, Chapter 2,
supra, under The Civil Trial amd the Constitution.
204

205

·soa u.s. 49 (1993).

206

!d. at 60.
I d. at 62.

207

208
209

/d.

I d. at 56, 61.
RESTATEMENT § 110, Reporter's Note to cmt. f: "Advocacy in a criminal-defense representation."
See also United States v. Nelson (In re Becraft), 885 'F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting "the absence
of authority imposing sanctions against defense counsel").
211
Emphasis added.
212 /d., cmt. f.
210
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Illustrating the rare cases in which criminal defense counsel have been
sanctioned, the Restatement213 cites In re Becraft. 214 In Becraft, the Ninth Circuit
imposed a sanction against a lawyer in a criminal appeal who had repeatedly raised
an argument that the court characterized as a "patent absurdity" and that the
Eleventh Circuit had previously found to be ''utterly without merit."21 s Even in
such a case, however, the court emphasized its reluctance to sanction a criminal
defense lawyer. 216
The court noted that because significant deprivation of liberty is often at stake
in a criminal prosecution, "courts generally tolerate arguments on behalf of
criminal defendants that would likely be met with sanctions if advanced in a civil
proceeding."217

[7]

The Necessity to Make "Frivolous" Arguments in Death
Penalty Cases218

As we have seen, even in civil cases, lawyers have considerable range, both
ethically and constitutionally, in raising issues that are arguably frivolous. With
respect to criminal defense, moreover; courts are loath to impose sanctions against
lawyers in any case in which the defendant's liberty is at stake. 21 $

Furthermore, as serious as is loss of liberty, our jurisprudence recognizes that
death is different. 220 This is so not only as a fact of life and death, but also for the
practical re::}S~n tha;t appellate and post-con~ction remedies are pur~ued in almost
2 13

/d., Reporter's Note to cmt. f.

214'

885 F.2<i'547 (9th Cir. 1989).

215 Id. at 548, 549. In a number of tax evasion cases, Becraft had unsuccessfully contended that the
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize a direct nonapportioned income tax on resident United States
citizens, and thus the federal income tax laws are unconstitutional with respect to such citizens. !d. at
548. It is difficult to contemplate the national chaos that would follow a decision that the collection of
income taxes from resident citizens is unconstitutional; ahd that it has been so for almost a century.
Becraft bad also argued that state citizens are not subject to federal jurisdiction, on the ground that
federal authority is limited to the United States territories and the District of Columbia (id. at>549) an argument that makes one wonaer how prescient Becraft was with respect to the Rebnquist Court's
views on federalism.

216 !d. at 550 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
[W)e are hesitant to exercise our power to sanction under Rule'38 against criminal defendants
and their counsel. With respect•to counsel, such reluctance, as evidenced by the lack of
authority imposing sanctions against defense counsel, primarily stems from our concern that
the threat of sanctions may chill a defense counsel's willingness to advance novel positions of
first impression. Our constitutionally mandated adversary system of criminal justice cannot
function properly unless defense counsel feels at liberty to press all claims that could
conceivably invalidate his client's conviction. Indeed, whether or not the prosecution's case is
forced to survive the "crucible of meaningful adversarial testing" may often depend upon
defense counsel's willingness and ability to press forward with a claim of first impression.
217

Id.

218 See Monroe Freedman, The Professional ObLigation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Peruilty
Cases, 31 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1167 (2003).
219
In re Becraft, 885 F.2d at 550.
220
See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983). See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 804,
337 (2002) (Scalia, J., disapproving but recognizing the Court's "death-is-different jurisp111dence.").
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100% of cases in which the death penalty is imposed.221 It is therefore crucial that
in any capital case, "anY. and all conceivable errors" be preserved for, revjew.~22 The
alternative is that a client may be put to death by the state, .despite reversible
error, because counsel has waived the issue or defaulted on it.
An example is Smith tt Kemp.223 This was one of two prosecutiqns for the same
mw·der. In the case involving codefendant Machetti, who was the "mastermind" in
the Clime,224 the lawyers timely raised the issue that women had been
unconstitutionaliy under-represented in the jury pool. 225 As a result, Machetti's
conviction and death sentence were overturned, resulting in a new trial and a
•
sentence of life in prison.22s

Codefendant John Ejldon Smith was tried in the same county, by a jury drawn
from the same jury pool. However,· Smith's lawyers did not tiffiely' raise the
constitutional issue, because they h~ overlooked .authority that gave support .to
the argument. 227 Since his lawyers' failure to r aise the issue was not adequate to
overcome nonconstitutional reasons of comity, finality, and agency, Smith was
electrocuted.
The agency issue is an essential part of the jurisprudence of death. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by )'ustice O'Connor, expt·essly relied upon th~
Restatement of ~gency § 242, for th,e ''well-settled principle of agency law'' that a
master is subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent conduct of a servant
within the scope of the employment.228 Thus, the Court could "discern no inequity"
in requiring a c~inal defend~t (''the ~aster'') to ''bear the. rls!< of attorney
error."229 The error in that case was Qt~t the attorney (''the servant") was sev~ncy
two hours late in fili.Iig a "purely ministerial" notice of appeal in the state court. 230
Accordingly, Roger Coleman was precluded from raising eleven constitutional
challenges to his conviction, and he too was put to death by the state.231

221

ABA G UIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
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Guideline 10.8, History of Guideline (Feb. 2003).
222 / d., Commentary (quoting Steven B. Bright. Preserving Error at Capital Trials, THE CHAMPION,
Apr. 1997, at 42-43).
2·23 715 F .2d 1459 (1983).
22' / d. at 1476 (Hatchett, J., conclllring in part and dissenting in part).
225 Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982).
226 ·Kemp, 715 F.2d at 1476 (Hatchett, J., conclllring in part and dissenting in part).
227 I d. at 1470-.71 (citing/Taylor v . Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
CASES,

(1~9)).

228

Qloleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
I d. at 753.
230 /d. at 742.
231 Justice O'Connor also relied on federalism to support her opinion. I ndeed, the first words of her
opinion, in a case involving whether a person'wilJ' live or die; are: ''This is a case about federalism:· /d.
at 726. But see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1991), where Justice O'Connor chose
to ignore the federalism issue (raised by her dissenting colleagues) to allow a cause of action for seXist
harassment of a schoolgirl - an important issue, but not one as compelling as death by electrocution.
229
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A similar agency problem arises when a lawyer makes the tactical decision to
omit an argument that appears to be weak (or when a lawyer claims to have done
so when· challenged 1with ineffective assistance of counsel). Smith tt Murray
provides an illustration.232 There the lawyer chdse to forgo an argument that was
contrary to an opinion that the VIrginia Supreme Court, had handed down only two
years oefore. Writing for the . United ~tates Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor
praisea the lawyer for "winnowing out~> the weak argument and foc~sing on those
more likely to prevail: and lauded this practice as the "hallmark of effective
appellate advocacy."233

As a result of this model of effective appellate advocacy in the state court,
however, the lawyer's client .was precluded from raising a winning constitutional
issue in the federal cow-ts.234 As Justice O'Connor held, the lawyer's "deliberate,
tactical deci~ion" to winnow out what appeared to him to have been a weak
argument in the .state appeal, made it "self-evident" that the lawyer's client had
given up his ri~ht to have the argument heard on federal habeas corpus.235
The conclusion is clear. Counsel in a capital case must, as a matter of
professional responsibility, raise every Iissue at every level of the proceedings that
might conceivably persuade even one judge in an appeals court or in the Supreme
Cowt, in a direct apJ?eal or in a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence. This
is tl!e ~ssence of the Guideline 10.8 in the ABA's Guidelines fm· the Appointment
and, Performance of fJefense Cm.msel in Death Penalty· Cases.236 In addition, as
noted in the Commentary to Guideline 10.8(A)(3)(d), assertion of a claim (even a
''!Jiyo)~us" one) might increase the chances qf a desirable plea a~eement or might
fayqra~ly influence a governor or other official in making a de,cision regarding
clen.f~p-?y.
'
.
In short, particularly in a capital case, the lawyer for the accused has a
professional obligation to assert at every level of the proceedings what otherwise
might be deemed a frivolous claim. Moreover, the same is true in any case involving
potential deprivation of liberty in which an appeal or collateral attack might be
contemplated.

232 477 U.S: 527 (1986).
•.233

ld. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751-62 (1983)). This position is not universally
accepted. See. e.g., Monroe Freedman, Wiener's Briefing a?Ui Arguing Federal Appeals, 30 Gro. WASH.
L. REV. 146 (1961) (book review) (arguing that effective advocacy requires that the lawyer raise every
issue that might conceivably attract even one vote on a multi-judge panel).
234 Murray, 477 U.S. at 551--53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235 /d. at 533-34. Justice,O'ponnor also noted, "tjle profound societal costs that attend the exercise of
habeas jurisdiction,'' but had nothing to say about the costs to society and to the individual when a
bearing on a legitilnate constitutional claim is denied in a d¥tp case. /d. at 539.
2315 ABA GUJDJt LIN'£$ FOR THE APPOtNTMEN'l' AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE CoUNSEL IN· D &ATH P E NALTY
CASES (revised ed. Feb. 2003).
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TRIAL PUBLICIT¥237

The Firs~ Amendmen! right to freedom of SJ>eE:~h is ne~er more impo~t ,than
when an individual has bl'!en publicly accused of wrongful conduct, in .a criminal
prosecution or a civil complaint.238 A pros~cu~r or,, civil litigant is privileged.to
publish to the world - including one's, family, friends, .neighbors, ,bus~ness
associates, and potential customers - what in most oth~ circumstances would be
grounds for a libel action. In a criminal case, "the scales of justice in the·eyes of the
public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against an accused· after his i ndictment."Z39 In a civil case•it may be no less urgent to respond publicly to allegations
of shameful conduct like fraud, malpractice, spousal or child abuse, pr sellihg
products that can maim or kill. Also, the delay before ultimate vindication may be
many months, if not years, 240 and a good name earned during a lifetime can be
destroyed.241 There can be no more pressing occasion for irhmediate, effective
public rebuttal. 242 Moreover; the ordinary citizen can gain access to the news media
only when the allegations have first been made public or a trial has begun, because
only then is "the full spotlight of media attention . . . focused upon him." 243
It could be disastrous, however, for an unskilled defendant to confront the

237

Trial publicity by prosecutors is treated separately, in Chapter 10 on "Prosecutor$• Ethics."
See Monroe Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Ji1reedom of Expression by
Defendants and Defense Attorneys, 29 STAN. L. Rsv. ~{19'77). ,"
·
239 Chicago Council of Lawyet·s v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir.-1973), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3201
(19'76). See also ALFRco FRIENDLY & RoNALD GoLDFARB, CRIMJ;t AND ,P.u~LICITY 13&-36 (1968), cited in Max
D. Stern, The Right of the Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HARv. Q.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 83 (1983).
238

240

'1\vo years after extensive condemnation of Dr. Bernard Bergman in the news media._ in which he
said: ''[l]t
appears to be undisputed that the media (and people desiring to be" featured in the media) have vilified
him for many kinds of evildoing of which he has in fact been innocent." United States v. Bergman, 416
F. Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Sentencing Memorandum).
241 After he was acquitted of criminal charges involving dishonesty, former Secretary of Labor Ray
Donovan bitterly commented, "Now tell me where I can go to •get my good name back." See How Do I
Repair Reputation? Dmwvan After His 'f'rial, CHI. Tam., ¥ay 27, 1987, at C4. The same can be said
about Captain James J . Yee, a former Muslim chaplain at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Captain Yee was initially charged with espionage and aiding 'the enemy, which resulted in his being held
for seventy-six days in the naval brig, much of the time in leg Irons. Although these charges were
dropped, Captain Yee was then •charged with adultery arid downloading pornography. Those charges
were ultimately thrown out on appeal. See Reuters, Convictions DI'"O]}ped jar Muslim Chaplain at
Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. Tu.tEs, Apr. 15, 2004, atA24; Editorial, Military Injustice, N.Y. 'liMEs, Mar. 24,
2004, at!A20.
242
"I . . . would shudder at the prospect of being charged ..with some crime, especially one of moral
turpitude, and being condemned to suffer silence until some distant day when even an acquittal would
not be recompense." Vermont Royster, The Ji1ree Press and a Fair Trif!J,, 43 N.C. L. REV. 364, 369 (1965).
243 United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1987). The court continued:
The defendant's interest in r eplying to the charges and to the associated adverse publicity,
thus, is at a peak. So is the public's interest in the proper functioning of the judicial machinery.
The "accused has a first Amendment right to reply publicly to the prosecutor's charges, and
the public has a right to hear that reply, because of its'ongoing concern for the integrity of th.e
criminal justice system and the need to hear from those most directly affected by it."
Id., quoting Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Priar Restnnints on Freedom of Expression by
Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi tt Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. Rsv. 607, 618 (1977).
was described as "The Meanest Man in New York:' tne federal judge who heard the

case
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cacophony and confusion of'a press conference. ~44 Evefi sophistica~d· and articulate
people have been known to flounder in the face of a press corps eager for an
embarrassing sound bite or unflattering photo. Also, as Justice Brennan has noted,
public 'statements by the defendant that appeared to ·be incriminatory could be
ad~ssible at trial.2-45 Defense eourlsel, by virtue of her knowledge about the case
anq·her training~as an advocate, is frequently the most appropriate person to speak
publiCly on behalf bf the -defendant.
As Congressman (later President) Jam~s Buchanan said, in a case involving the
imprisonment ,of a lawyer, for criticizing a judge, it is ''the imperative duty of an
attorney to protect the interests of his client out.of court as well as in court." 246
Former White .!Jouse counsel Leonard Garment has commented on his duty to
represent his. clients in 1Jle court of public opiniog as well as in the courtroom.247
Moreover, the defense lawyer's p~lic explanation of what is at stal>.e in the case can
be important to raising the funds, that are necessary to mounting an effective
defense.248 ,Thus, zealous representation may well require the lawyer to speak out
publicly on the client's behalf.:t-49

The principal reason given for restricting trial publicity is that it can interfere
with the constitutional right to a fair trial. But the Supreme Court has made it clear
that it is virtually impossible to make a trial constitutionally unfair by trial publicity,
even by pervasive prejudicial publicity that has been purposefully instigated by the
prosecution.
During a brief five-year period during the 1960s, the Supreme Court did overturn
four criminal convictions on grounds of prejudicial trial publicity.250 However, in
Murphy tt Florida,251 the Supreme Court distinguished those cases away, describing the trials themselves with phrases like "circus atmosphere," "carnival," "utterly
corrupted by press coverage:' and "the verdict of a mob."2112 Further, the Court held
that even a showing that a juror pad a ''preconceived notion as to the guilt . . . of
an accused" because of pretrial publicity is not sufficient to establish that a trial is
244

Also, in a criminal case, the defendant may be held without bail and unable to speak out effectively.

245

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 600, n.25 (1?76) (Brennan, J., concurring).

246 LAuRENCE TRIBE, ksRJCAN CoNSTITUTIONAL

LAw 628, n.26 (1978).

247

Barbara Cottman Becnel, Seeking Publicity Increasingly Seen as Trial Tactic: Lawyers
Unabashedly Try to Win.in Court of Public Opinion., L.A. DAlLY J., July 28, 1987, at 1. See also Robert
8. Bennett, P1ll8s Advocacy and the HighrProjile Client, 30 Lov. L.A. L. Rsv. 13 (1996); Stanley S. Arkin,
Self Defense by the Defense- Publicity, Fair 7lrial, N.Y.L.J., JW!e 11, 198, at 1.
Another compelling reason for the defense lawyer to exercise his or her right of free speech about the
case is that the lawyer might be the target of news media criticism relating to the case.
246

A case in point is given in Stem,•supra note 239, at 80.

249

The decision for the lawyer to do so is the client's, after proper counseling by the lawyer. See
Chapter 8, supra. But compare MR 1.2(a), ~hich would appear to allow the lawyer to engage in publicity
over the cliel\t'S objections, on the groWld that trial publicity is a "means" or "tactic" rather than an
"objective."
250
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S 582 (1965); Sh~ppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 85 Ohio Op. 2d 481 (1966).
251
252

421 u.s. 794 (1975).
I d. at 797-99.
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constitutionally unfair.253 Thus, after Murphy, no trial can be found unfair unless it
has been "utterly corrupted" by publicity.2s-4
The virtual impossibility of meeting the "utterly corrupted" or "verdict of a mob"
standard .is illustrated by Murphy itself. Before the trial, the jurors were exposed
to extensi~e prejudicial publicity about Murphy and his. criminal record. Murphy's
record included the theft of the Star of India sapphire and a conviction for murder.
This }Vas known to all.members of the jury, one of whom "freely· admitted that he
was predisposed to convict" Murphy.255 ,Also, the trial court denied a •motion for a
chang!'! of venue. Even Chief Justice IJurger characterized the media cover.age as
''bizarre" and criticized the tris:U dudge for having failed to prevent· pretrial
discussiop of the. prejudicial publicity -among·the jurors.256 Nevertheless, the Court
rejected Murphy's claim that his triafhad been prejudice,d. Thereafter, in Mu 'Min
-u Vi?yinia, 257 the Court found no prejudice in a capital murder case where the
publicity included num~rous references to evidence that was both infiamniatory and
·
·
inaamissible.
In Ught of Murphy, Mu'Min,.and others,2!511 it seems.fanciful to suggest that the
defense could so taint a bial with, Rretrial publicity as to deny the government a fair
trial. Conside~ for example, GenW~ -u· State Bp,r of N ~ada, a disciplinary matter
arising out of. a criminal prosecution.2511 The )lllderlying,-ease involved the prosecution of Grady Sanders for theft of ne~ly $300,000 and nine pounds of cocaine from
a safety deposit-box being used by undercover police,officers for sting operations.
Early suspects were two police officers who had had access to the box. Almost
immediately, however, law enforcement officials announced that the officers had
been cleared, and identified Sanders, who owned the safety deposit company, as the
prime suspect.
'
The prosecution then is~qed extensive praise for the officers and copdem,nation
of Sanders.,. Prosecutors announced that the officers were cooperating with the
investigation but that Sanders was not. They described the officers as ''two of the
most daring and respected cops on the force," while Sanders was accused of being

253

/d. at 800.

2 5-4

Id. at 798.

255

I d. at 804 (Brennan, J ., dissenting).
I d. at 808 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
257
500 u.s. 415 (1991).
258
Another extreme case in which no prejudice was found is Patton N. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984)':
Su also Beek v. Washington, 369-T:l.S. 541 (1962) (extensive reporting of a J.I.S. Senate investigatjon and
of the grand jury indictment of the accused did not deprive defendant of fair trial); United States v.
Haldeman, 669 F.2d 31, 69-71 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied (1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2641 (1977) (the
"extraordinarily heavy coverage" of the Watergate conspiracy did not deprive the defendantS of a fair
trial).
For an earlier case in which the COurt found no pPejtldice despite pervasive adverse publicity that was
actively promoted by the prosecution, see Stroble v. Califohua, 343 u.s. 181 (1952). The pretrial publicity
in Stroble included the defendant's confession to the sexual molestation and murder of a six-year-old girl.
It was published along with headlined descriptions of the defendant as a "werewolf," a "ftend,'' and a
"sex-mad killer."
256

2 &9

501

u.s. 1030 (1991).
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linked to organized crime. This kind of prejudicial publicity, orchestrated by the
prosecution, went on for a year before Sanders was indicted.
Oddly enough, the Gentile case waS not a disciplinary action against the Sanders
prosecutors for engaging in pretrial publicity in violation of Model Rule 3.6. Instead,
the target was Sanders' defense lawyer, Dominic Gentile. Just after his client's
indi<!tment, and following the year of prejudicial publicity about his client, Gentile
had held a short press conference to offer Sanders' side· of the case. If he had not
done so, there would have been another six months of unanswered attacks before
Sanders' triaJ,•Gentile said that Sanders was innocent, that four of the witnesses
against him were known drug-dealers and convicted money-launderers, that the
likelY' thief was one of the undercover officers, antl that Sanders was a scapegoat.
Six months later, the jury agreed·.
The Ne~ada Supreme Court, in upholding the disciplinary action against Gentile,
specifically found that he had not prejudiced the case. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has been unable to find prejudice even in cases like Murphy and Mu'Min.
With striking inconsistency, however, a majority of five justices, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Gentile hrul'violated what was then MR 3.6 by
creating a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the trial." 260 Also, the
majority upheld the constitutionality of the "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" standard for lawyer discipline, even though the Nevada court had
interpreted this clause to be less stringent than a "clear and present danger"
standard.
A different majority of the Supreme Court rever&ed the disciplinary action
against Gentile, however, on the ground that MR 3.6 was void for vagueness under
the Due Process Clause. On this issue, Justice Sandra'Day O'Connor broke from
the R~hnquist opinion, giving Justice Anthony Kennedy a majolity of five. The
Court's focus in dealing with the vagueness issue was MR 3.6(c), the' "safe harbor"
provision. This provision said that even though the lawyer's speech has a substantial
likelih6od of -materially prejudiciiig the trial, he may nevertheless state, "without
elaboration,'' the "general" nature of the defense. The Kennedy majority held that
the words "elaboration" and "general" are "classic terms of degree" which, in the
context of MR 3.6, "have no settled usage or tradition of interpr etation." For those
reasons, lawyers could only "guess at its contours." Accordingly, the rule was
unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

The ABA responded to Gentile with an amended MR 3.6.261 Subsection (a) again
forbids a lawyer to make an out-of-court statement that the lawyer ''knows or
reasonably should know- . . . will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudici~g an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."262 However, adopting the

2150
The Rehnquist majority found this potential prejudice in Gentile's statement of his client's
innocence and the detective's guilt, and in his ref~ce to the cparacter, credibility, and crimipal records
of witnesses ag_ainst Sanders. In short. they fqupd that Gentile hJid prejudiced a fair trial by responding
directly ~.the publicity that had already been broadcast by the pros~tion.
261
MR 3.8, which relates to prosecutors' ethics, was also amended with regard to trial publicity. See
Chapter 10, infra.
262

The restriction applies, of course, only to a lawyer who is "participating or has participated in the
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position recommended in the first edition of this book,263 the new rule 'has a
subsection that renders the proscription almost entirely ine:ffectiv,e. MR 3.6(c) says
that notwithstanding subsection (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a
reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the "substantial
undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the
lawyer's client."
r
That means that the laW)_'er may, with impunity, defend her client's reputation,
regardless of whether the hirm.fu.I statements about the client have been made by
the other· side or by third persons. 264 Moreover, a lawyer for a c.rimihal defendant
is permitted to respond publicly to the indictment whenever the charges have been
publicized.
In addition, notwithstanding subsection MR 3.6(a), MR 3.6(b)(2) permits the
lawyer to"state publicly any information "contained in a public record."255 For many
years, prosecutors have created a fulsome public record with a "speaking indictment,'' which details the charges and any other defamatory information that the
prosecutor wants to trumpet in press conferences.255 Although criminal defense
lawyers and civil lawyers have been slow to realize it, they too ·can create public
records that can effectively exempt them from MR 3.6(a). For example, criminal
defense lawyers, can file bail applications, motions to dismiss the indictment,
motions in limine, and motions to suppress evidence, all of which can include
information that the lawyer wants to discuss publicly. Similarly, lawyers in civil
cases can freely discuss any information contained in complaints, answers, motions
to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and any other pleadings or discovery
documents that ha.ve been filed with the court and that are not subject to a
protective order.
For practical purposes, therefore, MR 3.6 does not restrict criminal or civil
lawyers'from ze~ously representing their clients in the public forum as well as in
court. Indeed, for a lawyer to do so, as noted by Justice Anthony Kennedy, is not
just permit):.ed but can be lawyer's duty;257

a

An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or- she
cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the
client. . . . [A]n attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's
reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment. . . . A
defense attorney
may pursue laWful str~~gies . . . including an attempt tp
1
demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve
to be bied.

investigation or litigation of [the] matter." MR 3.6(a).
253 MoNROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSI'ANDING LAWYERS' ETmcs 228-36 (1st ed. 1990). Su also Monroe
Freedman, Muzzling 'Trial Publicity, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at 24; Monroe Freedman, Silencing
Ds[enl!e Lawyers, LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1991, at 22.
254

This' is clear from a plain reading of MR 3.6(c) and from Comment [7].

265

An exception, of course, would be a document that is subject to a protective order.

255

Su Chapter 10, § 10.10, in,fra (on "Trial Publicity by Prosecutors''). We use the word "fulsome"
intending both dictionary meanings.
257 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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COMMUNICATING WITH OTHER PERSONS ON
BEID\LF OF Pi. CLIENT

A premise of the adversary system is that anyone who is or may be involved in

a legal matter is entitled to have the benefit of a trained and skilled )awyer. In
addition, there is a possibility of unfairness when a lawyer communicates with a
person who is or who,may be involved in a legal matter and who does not have legal
representation. Ethical rules 'therefore limit lawyers ih their communications with
non-l~wyers when representing clients. The .underlying concern is that the nonlawyer .could be at a significant disadvantage because of ignorance of the law and of
lawyering skills. In addition, there are rules forbidding lawyers to mislead th!rd
parties.

.

.

The rules th~efore deal with two,categories.of cases, those in,whicq the person
with wh9m the lawyer communicates is unrepresented, and those in which the
person ,is represented by another lawyer. These rules are often thought of as
protecting persons whose interests are "adverse" to those of a lawyer's client, but
they are not limited to protecting the interests of parties who are opposed to each
other in litigation or across a bargaining table. For example, the rules protect
potential witnesses from being misled regarding the lawyer's partisan role in ·a
matter that the lawyer is investigating.

Ul

Communicating with Unrepresented Persons

We begin with lawyers who communicate with non-lawyers who have no legal
representation. Under Rule 4.3 of the Model Rules, a lawyer dealing on behalf of a
client with an unrepresented person,is forbidden to st:ate or imply that ~he la~er
is disinterested. In addition, if the lawyer knows or reasqnably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role, the lawyer must make
reasonabie efforts 'to correct the misuhderstandj._ng. The lawyer is pe~tte~ to
interview the unrepresented person to investigate'the matter, but she may have an
affi.nnative obligation to clarify her role even if she has done notliing affirmatively
to mislead the person.
MR 4.3 forbids a lawyer to give legal advice to an unrepresented person, 'o ther
than ~e advice to secure counsel; if th~ lawyer knov.;s or reasonably shoul9 know
that the il}terests of' the person are, or have a reasoq_able possibility of being, in
conflict with the ihterests of the client. Moreover, entirely apart frol)l that rule,
lawyers should be cautious about giving legal advice to anyone whom they do not
represent. The Scope section of the Model Rules notes that the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship depends on state substantive la;w, ~hich will turn on the
facts of particular cases.268 If a lawyer does give legal advice to an unrepresen~d
per,son, therefore, j;he lawyer runs the risk of a fl.nding that the person has
reasonably understood that the lawyer has become that per.son's lawyer.26~ This
can expose the lawyer to m~practice liability to that person, based on a cl}IU'ge of
268

MoDEL RULEs scope [17].

~ Such a finding would be based on the formation of a contract implied in fact.

26
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incompetent representation and/or of a conflict of interest. 270
In addition, the lawy~r is forbidden by MR 4.l(a) to make a false sta}iemen~ of
material fact or law. tq a third person, atld by MR 8.4(c) to engage ip conduct
involvj.ng dishonesty, fraud, d~ceit, or misrepresentation. 271 Also, under MR 8.4(a),
the lawy~ m~y not violate a rule through the acts of another. MR 5.3 go~~ furt}ler,
requiring lawyers to ''make reasonable e(l'orts" to ensure that non-lawyers who are
associated with them act in ways consistent with the lawyers' professional
responsibilities. Moreover, MR 5.3(c) expressly makes a lawyer responsible for
conduct by a non-lawyer that the lawyer· ratifies.
These rules seem sensible and desirable, but can have undesirable
consequences. In the 1960s, Freedman was involved in efforts on behalf of a fair
housing group to enforce the District of Columbia's rules against racial
discrimination ~ housing. The onl1. way to m~e a case of discrimination was
through "testers." .A,n Mrican-.Arnerican couple would purport to be iriterested in
buying or renting a house in a particular peighborliood. They would claim to b~
married and to have two children and a particular.income level. Immediately after
they were told that no houses were available 1or s~e or rent in the n¢ghborhood,
a white couple purporting to have 't.be same famil){ and income would apply for a
house. When the white couple was then shown two or three available houses, there
would be persuasive 'evidence of racial discrimination.
This was .a reasonable - in fact, necessazy - way to carry the burden of
proving discrimination. The problem is that under the Model Rules, and under the
ethical rules at the time, Freedman's conduct was unethical. Acting through others
(the testers), be made material misrepresentations of fact to the real estate
brokers and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation. 212
· The same issue can arise, of course, in any litigation. In a case involving a
coverage dispute .between an insurer (Aetna) and its insured (Monsanto), Aetna's
lawyers sent out investigators to interview former ef\lployees of Monsapto.273
Affidavits of the former employees (which the judge credited) included a variety of
ways in which Aetna investigators had misled them. For example, some said that
investi.g ators had told .them that they represented Monsanto's insurance company
but had not said that Monsanto was suing the insurance company; the investigators
thereby gave the false impression ,that they were aligned with Monsanto. Other
affida~ts related more direct forms of misrepresentation.

270

With regard to conflicts of interest, see Chapter 9, infra.

211

MR 4.1 cmt. (1] says that a lawyer is "required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's
behalf, but generally has no a.ffirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts."
272

The same was true then under Canon 15 of Canons of Professional Ethics, which proscribed "any

manner of fraud or chicane."
273
Monsanto Co. v. Aetna. Casualty & Sw-ety Co., 593 A.2d 1018 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990). The
defendants were not just Aetna but several insurers, and related. to their liability for environmental
pollution litigation against Monsanto across the country.
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Tqe court's opinion is headed with a quotation from oral argument by Aetna's
counsel:274 "[Telling the truth in civil litigation] is, of course, a very attractive
proposition. But, I would like to ~sit with 'your Honor further examination of that
proposition, be'cause while that might be nice in a perfect world, it is not the way
the system operates in litigation in this country." TMt was a questionable way to
argue the issue that was before the court, and it gave rise to a questionable
response from an angry judge: "One who is in search of the truth must tell the
truth.''275
If the judge's proposition were accepted, no undercover or sting operation would
be permitted, and much activity that is more seriously antisocial than
mis1·epresenting one's·true role in an investigation would be virtually impossible to
uncover and to prove. 27$ Nevertheless, on the Ia.cts as found by the judge, he was
correct in concluding that the corlduct had violated the.Model Rules.m·

Some commentators have contended, though, that the Model Rules do not in any
case preclude "under<fover irivestigators" - tliose who "disguise identity or
purpose" in dealing with others.278 Others argue that the rules of lawyers' ethics
take the categm1cal position, in effect;· that "lying is never justified," and these
commentators recommend appropriate :amendments to take account of cases
where deception is morally justifiaDle.m
David B. Isbell and Lucantoni,o. N. Salvi contend that the Model Rules,
"properly read, . . . do not prohibit the use of misrepresentations solely with
regard to identity and purpose, and solely for evidence-gathering purposes, by
investigators and testers acting undei· the direction of lawyers."280
274 ld. at 1015.
275
Jd. at 1016. The judge's direct response was "in the strongest way possible to reject counsel's
observations !IS being so repugnant and so odious to fair minded people ti;Jat it can only be considered
as anathema to any system of civil justice under law." !d. at 1015.

Finding that the investigators' misleading conduct had tainted the ~. the judge issued an order
sClipting the informatioil investigator$ would have to provide to any other potential witnesses in the case.
ld. at 1021.

276 See, e.g., Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983):
This court and others have repeatedly approved and sanctioned the role of "testers" in racial
disClimination cases. [Citing casgs]. It is frequently difficult .to develop proof in discrimination
cases and the evidence provided by testerS is frequently .valuable, if not indispensable. . • .
[W)e have long ago recognized that this requirement of deception was a relatively small price
to pay to defeat racial discrimination.
See also David B. Isbell & Lucantionio N. Salvi, Ethical &sponsibility of Lawyers for Deception by
Un.t./..ercover Investigatms and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisiom Prohibiting
Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 795
(1995): "(l]nvestigators and testers serve socially desirable purposes, whose value to society outweighs
the costs of the deception involved."
277

Monsanto, s93 A.2d at 1020-21. The conouc,t"'would also have violated 'the Model COOe; see

discussion, supra.

278 Isbell & Salvi, supra note 276, at 795.
279
See, e.g., Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deceptim and Lawyers: Away fimn a Dogmatic Principle
and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722 (1989).

280 Isbell & Salvi, supra note 276, at 796.
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Here is the central part of their analysis.281 Rule 4.l(a) does forbid a lawyer to
')nake a false statement of material fact" to. a third person. However,·the rule is
prefaced by the phrase, "[i]n the course of representing a client." This phrase does
not refer, they say, to the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, but means· that
the lawyer must be "functioning-as a lawyer," and not as a "private citizen" in the
activity in question. But, they assert, "[i)nvestigators and testers are not ordinarily
lawyers and in any event do ·n.ot function as· such." Accordit;lgly, if a lawyer were to
act as an investigator, she would not be "functioning as a lay.'yel"' and therefore
would not be "in the course of representing a client." Moreover, a lawyer
supervising or ratifying the conduct •of the -investigator would no~ be acting
improperly under MR 5.3 for the same reason, that is, the conduct that is being
sup~rvised or ratified would not 'be unethical if engaged in by the lawyer. 282 •
'

I

'

As much as we \Xould like to reach the same conclusion, we cannot reconcile the
analysis with the text. In ordinary usage, the phrase "in representing a client"
clearly refers to activity on behalf of a client in the course of a lawyer-client
relationship. This is so even if the activity is 'Something that can be done by a
private citi~en, like reading a book, or writing a ·letter, o:r, for 'th'at matter,
interviewing a potential witness.213 Not surprisingly, therefore, ABA Formal
Opinion 95-396 says flatly, "if the investigator acts as the lawyer's 'alter ego: the
lawyer is ethically responsible for the investigator's conduat."214
Moreover, in commercial cases, we are confident that lawyers charge their
engaging in or clients fees for the lawyers' "professional services" for time that is
devoted to supervising undercover or sting operations. Also, we would expect that,
in appropriate .circumstances, lawyers wol11d assert a work-produc~ priyilege for
communications with 't heir ~nvestiga1;0rs/testers. Finally, a decisive refutation of the
Isbell-Salvi position is that it is irrelevant whether the lawyer who engages in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, dece\t, or misrepresentation is acting "as a
private citizen," rather than on b~half of a client. As properly noted in ABA Formal
Opinion 336, the ethical rules forbidding such conduct are not limited to acts by
lawyers in their capacity as lawyers.

281

!d. at 814-15.

282

/d. o.t 818-19.

213

Also, the authors assert that a distinction cannot properly. be drawn that would allow prosecutors
but not civil practitioners to conduct undercover activities. Such -a distinction, they say, "would find no
anchor in the text of the rule." !d. at 796.
Yet one might we11 focus on the same la.ngua'g e- "in' the course of representing a client"- and reach
that result. Lawyers in private practice "represent clients," within 't he meaning of MR 4.1. One of the
distinctive features of a prosecutor, however, is that she" has no client in 'the ordinary sense. 'Therefore,
consistent with the text. one might say that prosecutors, unlike private practitioners, are not covered by
MR 4.1. Ses F. Dennis Saylor, IV & J. Douglas Wuson1.J?utting a•SqutJ.rs Peg in a Round. Hole: Ths
Application of Model R-ule~£ to Fed.erof Prosectd<ml, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 459 (~992);
We are not persuaded by this argument either, and it b&IS, been expressly rejected by ABA Op, 95-396,
at notes 9 and 10. However, it works as well (or as poorly) as Isbell and Salvi's.
214
See also MR 5.3, which requires lawyers to "make reasonable efforts" to ensure that non-lawyers
who are associated with them act in ways consistent with the lawyers' professional responsibilities. In
addition, MR 5.8(<:) expressly makes a lawyer responsible for conduct by a non-lawyer that the lawyer
ratitle$.
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We agree, therefore, with those who urge that the Model Rules be amended to
permit deception. when certain criteria have been met.285 We propose the following
criteria: (1) there must be ,a good faith reason, consistent with' truth-seeking, to
perpetrate t he deception; (2) there must be no alternative means reasonably
available to achieve the result;286 (3) if the deception involves a tribunal, it must be
revealed within a reasonable time afteli it has occurred;287 and (4) no person may
be caused to suffer .significant and irreparable injury (other than exposure of
wrongful conduct) by the deception. 288

[2]

Communicating with Children

The Model Rules ·relating to transactions on behalf of clients with persons other
than clients28 9 do not distinguish between adults and children. Children are
essential witnesses in many civil and criminal cases, and proper trial preparation
requires that they be interviewed !iJ<e any other witnesses.290
For children as well as adults, therefore, the essential limitation of MR 4.4(a) is
that the lawyet< not use any means that have ''no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence
that vi,olate the legal 'rights" of that person. Short of that limitation, however,
Comment [1] to MR 4.4 recognizes that "[r]esponsibility to a client requires a
28
~ See, e.g., Shine, supra. note 279, at 750. Our criteria are similar in some respects to Shine's, but are
s!~cantly different overall.

2 ~·
8

This would involve consideration of the expense and delay required by formal discovery. Also, it
tlecognizes that before litigation is filed, formal discovery is tmavailable; yet a potential plaintiff is under
an obligation to have some factual basis before filing an action or else to risk sanctions, as under Rule
11.
287
288

See, e.g., discussion of In re Friedman, infra note 288.
In re Friedman, 392 N.'E.2d 1338 (Ill. 1979), was a disciplinary action against a prosecutor. The

case illustrates the four criteria, but-we also believe that Professor Freedman's analysis of the applicable
rules (discussed below) was correct on the facts of the case.
A police officer had told the prosecutor that the officer had been offered a bribe by a defense lawyer
if the officer testified falsely that the victim of an assault was unwilling to come to court. The only way
to make a case against the corrupt lawyer was to go forward with the scheme so that the ,bribe would be
paid. The prosecutor was subjected to discipline for presenting the officer's perjury and related
violations.
Professor F reedman submitted an affidavit in the case saying, in part, that the prosecutor had not
committed a disciplinary violation because his compelling motive had been to expose corruption in the
administration of justice, and because the relevant rules contemplate cases in which there is no intention
to reveal the deception to the tribunal (as tl,le pros~utor had promptly done). See· id. at 1336
(Underwood, J., concurring). Freedman analogized the case to a firefighter setting a backfire to stop a
confiagration .that threatens to destroy a city, and then being prosecuted for arson.
The Illinois Supreme Court split three ways, with a majority holding that the prosecutor had violated
the rules, but a different majority holding that. he ,should not be disciplined.

289 See MR 4.1 (TrutHfulness in Statements to Others), MR 4.2 (Communication with Person
Represented by Counsel), MR 4,$ (Dealing with Unrepresented Person), and MR 4.4 (Respect for
Rights of Third Persons).
290
Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). The Supreme Court held that an. accused's Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation outweighs a state's interest in protecting the privacy and encouraging
the rehabilitation of a juvenile. Accordingly, the state is forbidden to prevent cross-examination of a
witness about his probation for a juvenile offense.
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lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client."
Also, MR 4.1 forbids a lawyer to make a false statement of fact or law to a third
person. As previously noted, MR 4.3 forbids a lawyer to give legal advice to an
unrepresented person other than the advice to secure counsel. The comment to
MR 4.3 adds that "[w]hether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend
on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the
setting in which the behavior and comments occur." Thus, the comment assumes
that a lawyer may be interviewing a person of limited experience and
sophistication, and restricts only the nature of any advice that the lawyer might
give to such a person. There is no limitation, however, on the information that the
lawyer might seek from that person. 291

[3]

Communicating with Represented Persons (Civil')

Model Rule 4.2 forbids a lawyer to communicate about the representation with
a person the lawyer knows to be· represented by another attorney in the matter.
The two exceptions are when the person's attorney has authorized the lawyer to
make the contact, or when the lawyer is authorized by law.
In civil cases, controversy over this rule has centered around the issue of which
employees of a represented corporate party are ·included in the ban. The issue is
important because of the importance of fact investigation' and the considerable
expense of formal discovery, which can be prohibitive for many plaintiffs. This is
particularly true of depositions, which are the formal counterpart to informal
interviewing, and which can be made extremely expensive by defendants who have
the resources to prolong them.
First, with r egard to farmer employees, ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 has 'held
them to be outside MR 4.2, noting that "[n]either the Rule nor its comment
purports to deal with former employees of a corporate party."292 The committee
reasoned that "the effect of the Rule is to inhibit the acquisition of information
about one's case," and therefore ''the Committee is loath ... to expand [the Rule's]
coverage to former employees by means of liberal interpretation."
With regard to current employees, Comment [7] to MR 4.2 says that the
prohibition extends to·(l) "a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs
or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter," or (2)
one who ''has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability."
Comment [8] adds that this restriction applies only when the lawyer "knows that
the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the
291 Nevertheless, some judges mistakenly believe that lawyers are forbidden to interview children. In
one case, for example, a judge contended that it was "really egregious" for a lawyer to "talkO directly"
to a child, and held the lawyer in contempl See Gwen Filosa, Defender, lnvesf:igator fov.nd i1t Co-ntempt;
They Tried to Interview Children in Rape Case, TIMEs-PICAYUNE, July 16, 2009, at Al. The contempt was
reversed in an unpqblished opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
292

Emphasis in the original.
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lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation." Otherwise, the
lawyer's communication with that person would be governed by MR 4.3.

[4]

Communicating with Represented Persons (Criminal)

As just discussed, MR 4.2 forbids a lawyer to communicate about the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented in the matter,
except when the lawyer has been authorized by the person's attorney or when
authorized to do so by law or a court order.

There has been controversy regarding whether prosecutors are bound by the
no-contact rule of MR 4.2. 293 For example, prior to 1995 MR 4.2 forpad contact
only with a represented "party." The argument was made, therefore, that
prosecutors,could freely contact a criminal suspect through an undercover agenteven if the suspect had a lawyer with regard to that matter - because until there
was an ·indictment, there was no case, and the suspect was therefore not a "party"
within the rule. 294 Only by amending the rule to change ''party'' to ''person," it was
argued, could pre-indictment contacts by included in the rule.295 In 1995 that
argument was eliminated by amendment of MR 4.2, which changed "party" to
"person." That, however, did not end the debate.
There has always been general agreement that prosecutors are governed by
ethical codes applicable to other lawyers. Any doubt about whether that includes
federal prosecutors acting within particular states was answered by Congress in
1998·by the Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government Act (The McDade
Amendinent). 296 The Act provides that government attorneys are. subject to the
ethics rules of "each state where such attorneys engage in their duties, to the same
extent and in the samE)Jllanner as other attomeys in that State."
That has not ended the debate over the applicability of MR 4.2 to federal
prosecutors, however, because of the exception for contacts with represented
parties· that are "authorized by law." Unfortuhately, that phrase is ambiguous
(perhaps intentionally so), and commentators tend to find whatever meaning they
look for.
One argument in support of prosecutors' contacts with represented persons is
that courts have held that a wide range of such contacts do not violate
constitutional protections relating to the right to counsel, self-incrimination, and
due process.297 The contention is that those holdings mean that the courts have
293 See, e.g., Alafair S.R. Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutarial P()'U)er: The
Non·Cvntact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635 (1994); Roge1· C. Cnmton & LisaK. Udell, State Ethics
Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversiqs P,W1' 0e Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 291 (1992); ABA Op. 95-396; Monroe H. Freedman, End Run at the Justice Department,
LEGAL TIMEs, June 3, 1991.
•
294
See, e;g., ABA Op. 95-396 (dissent by Ralph B. Elliot).
295 Id.

296

28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
For further discussion of prosecutors violating ethical rules relating to truthfulness (MR 4.1 and
8.4(c)) and communication with persons known to be 'represented by lawyers (MR 42); see irifra in this
chapter, Breaking Rules in Criminal Cases. See esp. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.·412 (1986).
297
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given "authorization by law'' to prosecutors to engage in such contacts. However,
holding that particular prosecutorial conduct does not violate the Constitution is
not the same as holding that it is "authorized by law'' for purposes of state ethical
requirements.
The Supreme Court has emphasized this point. In Mabry u Johnson; for
example, a unanimous court noted that the- concern of the ·Due Process Clause is
with "the manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty," and is not "a code
of ethics for prosecutors."2911 ' Also, in Nix u Whiteside, Chief Justice Warren
Burger cautioned that courts must be careful not to "constitutionalize particular
standards of professional conduct •and thereby intrude into the State's proper
authority."2H Burger ther~ emphasized and elaboratM on that point, saying,
"[t]he fact that the Constitution pennita particular conduct does hot mean that it's
professionally appropriate to engage in that conduct."300 ·That is, when 'a court
says, "[i]t's not unconstitutional," the court does not mean, "[i]t's ethical," ·or "[w]e
think you ought to do it."301
Consistent with those Supreme Court pronouncements, comment [51 to MR 4.2
says that "[t]he fact , that a cominunii!ation does not violate a state or federal
constitutional right is insufficient to establish that the epmtnunication is
permissible under this Rule."
'

Nevertheless, the same comment includes some equivocal language that is
calculated to continue th,e debate1 The comment says tpat copimunications
authorized by law ''may" include (note that it does not say that they "do" include)
investigative ~ti'{itie~ of lawyers representing governrllental agencies, directly or
through investigative agents, "prior to the commencement of criminal or
enforcement proceedings." Also, the comment says that when communicating with
"the accused in a criminal matter," a government lawyer must comply with MR 4.2.
By negative implication, the quoted phrase aan be'·taken to mean that until there is
a "crimihal matter," and until the person being investigated has fonnally·become
"the accused," a government lawyer is not bound by MR 4.2.

'
One final point, which is addressed by ABA Opinion 95-396, deserves
mention
here. There are situations in which a criminal defendant's lawyer is selected and
paid by those for whom the defendant is employed. When that happens, there is a
significant and plausible risk that the lawyer's loyalty is more to the employers
than to the defendant. In short, there is a conflict of interest.ao2 In such cases, the
defendant is "represented," but not necessarily willingly and as he should be
represented. Nevertheless, the defendant may be reluctant to discharge the lawyer
2"

467 U.S. 50ol, 611 (1984). Su aho United .States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. !11, 110 (1976) ("Nor do we

believe the constitutional obligation (of a prosecutor) is measured by the moral culpability .. ·.of the

prosecutor.").
zeg 475 u.s. 157, 165 (1986).
300

A.B.A J. (Aug. 1990).

SOl Jd. See auo ABA Op. 9&-396 (Coll8titutional protections establish only "minimal historic
standards" that defendants must receive, while ethics rules "seek to regulate the conduct of lawyers
according to the standards of professionalism").

JOZ

See Chapter 9, i'lifro., on Conflicts of Interest, especially§ 9.06 headed "The Preventive Rationale."
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and obtain independent representation. It would be improper, even in such a case,
fur a prosecutor ·to bypass the lawyer and commun}cate directly with the
defendant.303 On occasion, though, a. defendant will initiate contact with the
prosecutor. What then?
Because of our emphasis on client autonomy,304 we are concerned that no
criminal defendant have a lawyer imposed upon him by others. We agree with
Opinion 95-396, therefore, that an appropriate course of action would be for the
prosecutor to request that a court (if there is one with jurisdiction) speak with the
defendant on the record but without the presence of either defense counsel or
prosecutor. The purpose of such a hearing would be to determine whether the
defendant is satisfied with his lawyer or wants independent" counsel and, if he does
want independent eo'unsel, to have the court appoint a new lawyer. AB also noted in
Opinion 95..396; the prosecutor, even though she has been approached by the
defendant, should refrain from offering·any advice or engaging in any substantive
discussions with him. 305

§ 4.11

DOES ZEAL EVER JUS'DIFY BREAKING OTHER
ETHICAL RUhES?
.

The outer limit of zealous representation is clear. Zealous representation must be
carried out only "within the bounds of the. Iav.;, whkh includes Disciplinary
Rules." 306 Thus; we would not advise a lawyer-cllertt, much Mss a law student, to risk
professional discipline· by violating a discip.l inary rule, even if our view waS' that
l'farticular circumstances warranted doing so. The fiduciary obligations of a lawyer
to a client, and a professor to a student,·would trump any!personal views we might
have about the undesirability of following a particular rule.
1

I

!

Nevertheless, some of t he preceding discussion in this chapter, and specifically
that relating to underco~er operations,307 raises a question that is seldom if ever
addressed in discussions of lawyers' ethics. Does zealous representation ever justify
breaking the ethical rules? 305
303

However, it would be appropriate for a judge, sua spont~. to assure herself that the defendant has
voluntarily waived the conftict of interest.
304 See Chapter 3, supra.
" 05 See ABA Op. 95-396. We have modified the language in the opinion to make it clear that neither
a prosecutor nor the defense lawyer should be present at the hearing. Also, we disagree with. the
suggestion in the opinion that the court might authorize the prosecutor to communicate directly with the
defendant rather than appoint new defense counsel. In order to assure an informed waiver, a defendant
should have the advice of counsel before waiving counsel and dealing directly with the proseCutor.
306 MoosL Coos EC 7-1, DR 7-101. This well-known language in the Model Code is mirrored in the
MOdel Rules in Comment 1 to Rule 1.3:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.
See Monroe Freedman, Henry Lord IJrougha.m and ze:J., 34 Ho~;,.IVo L. REV. 1319 (,20Q6).
307 See discussion, supm..
.
'
'
308

See Monroe Freedman, In Pm.ise ofOverzeal()'U$ Repre8entati<m- Lying to Judge$, Deceiving
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Breaking Rules in Civil (l;ases

We have mentioned that. Freedman, in preparing, housing discrimination
litigation, sept out investigators/te~ters who misrepresented their identities and
desire to buy a house. This wo~d 'liplate ethical rules forbid~i~g a lawyer to make
a false statement of material fact to another person or engage in CQ11duct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta~on. 309 In similar circumstances, we
would do so again.
·
Would this be unethical? On a plain-meaning .reading of ,the. rules, yes. 310 Af3
recognized by Second Circuit ~udge , J~es L. Oakes, ·in an opinion cited with
apparent approval by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, "[T]he
ptivate lawyer who participates in a sting operation almost necessarily runs afoul
M the canons oflegal ethics."311 Oakes went on tO explain that a lawyer is forbidden
to "[e]ngage in conduct ' involVing · dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation:'312 and that law)ferll are subject'to this duty even when they are
not· acting in their capacity as lawyers.313 •
•
~espite

.

'

.

the plain meaning of lfhe ethical rules, however, ,courts regularly acceP.t
evidence that ip produced by undercover or sting operations. For example, two
years before Judge Oakes' observations, ~he Seventh Circuit stated:
This court and others have repeatedly approved an(f sanctioned the role of
"testers" in racial discrimination cases. . . . It is frequently difficult- to
develop proof in discriminatiorl cases and the evidence proVided by testers
is frequently valuable, if not indispensable. . . . [W]e ·have long ago
recognized that this requirement of deeeption was a relatively· small price
to pay to defeat racial discrimination. 314
This judicial disposition to admit the fruits of sting operations is not restricted to
cases of racial discrimination, but extends to commercial cases as well. For example,
in a case involVing testers who misrepresented themselves in order to expose
trademark violations by a client's competitor, the' court hefd that excluding the
evidence obtained by the testers ''would·not serve the public interest or promote the
goals of the disciplinary rules."315 Also, in another unfair trade case, the court relied
Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HoFSTRA L. REV. 771 (2006). In addition to the ethic of zeal,
Professor Freedman's analysis relies on inconsistencies in the Model Rules, the Scope section Qf the
Model Rules, the client's constitutional rights, court decisions, biblical authorities, and moral philosophy.
309 MR 4.l(a), 4.3, 8.4(a) and (c), 5.3.
310
We are using the word "unethical" here to refer to a violation of one o1· more disciplinary ruJes,
and not to refer more generally til conduct that we would consider to be wrongful in a moral sense.
311
United States ex ret. VuittOn et Fils S.A. v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179, 186, 187-88 C2d Cir. 1985)
(Oakes, J. dissenting), rev'd sub
Young v. Unite() States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787
(1987). J udge Oakes objected to privately run sting operations tHat do not have prior judicial approval
from a court; this issue was not reached by the Supreme Court, which reversed the majority decision on
br{)ader grounds.
312 /d. (citing MoDEL CoDE, DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980); MR 8.4(c) (1988)).

nom

313
314
315

!d. (citing ABA Formal Op. 336 (1974)).
Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983).
Gidate.x, S.r.L v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119 (1999). The court relied in part on
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on an affidavit of Professor Bruce GreeD, who stated: "The prevailing understanding in the legal profession is that a public or private lawyer's use of an undercover
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is riot ethically 'proscribed,
especially wliere it would be "difficult to discover the violations by other means." 3111
Again, the cow-t admitted the evidence developed through a sting operation
involving misrEtpresentations.
What, then, is a conscientious lawyer to do? Can she, consistent with zealous (or
even diligent) representation, fail to develop essential evidence that is only available
through a sting operation? Indeed, if "the prevailing view in the legal profession" is
that such conduct is Ddt ethically· proscribed, can a lawyer competently fail to
conduct the sting?317

A similar issue bas. ¢ sen regarding a lawyer's .tape recording of a conversation
without disclosing to the other person ~hat th.e taping- is going on (a practice that
frequently accompanies s ting operaUQJ]S). In 1974, the ABA Ethics Committee held
that such taping was a violation of Model Code DR 1-102(A)(4), as conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.318 There are good reasons for such
a restriction: (1) people tend to choose their words with greater care when a
recording is being made; (2) the person who kno\v's a recording is being made has
an unfair advantage in choosing how to control the conversation and even in creating
misleading impressions;318 (3) the person who.knows a recording is being made has
an unfair advantage in being able to decide, unilaterally, not to use the recording at
all; and (4) some people would prefer not to speak under.such circumstances, but
are denied the choice.320 Nevertheless, twenty-five years later: the ABA committee
overrul~~ itself, holding that surreptitious taping does not violate ethical rules, as
long as doing so is not illegal in the jurisdiction.321
Jhis raises the questipn of whether lawyers who conducted surreptitious taping
before the ~A committee changed its opinion about the meaning .of the ethical
rules were acting unethically. It would appear, on the co.ntrary, that those lawyers
were properly engaged in zealous and competent representation, since courts were
regularly admitting evidence obtained in violation of ethical rules. 322

the article by Isbell and Salvi, which is criticized above.
3 16

Apple Corps v. International Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 475 (1998).

317

Competence requires "the legal . . . preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
MR 1.1.
•
318
31

ABA Formal Op. 337. The committee also cited other ethical rules.

~

See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, Keystone Kops in Jackboots, L EGAL TiMES, June 12, 1995 (illustrating
undercover operative's s uccess in creating misleading impressions of taped conversations).
320 SeeAss'n.ofthe Bar ofthe City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2003-02. Also, although taping of conversations
has becotpe common in many business contexts, we are accustomed to being given an automatic
apnouneement when it is being done.
321
Fonnal Op. 01-422. See aho Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 20()3..{)2, modifying
Ops. 1980-95 and 1995-10.
322
See, e.g., Stagg v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 162 AD.2d 595 (N.Y. 1990) ("New York
follows the common-law rule that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the means through
which it is obtained. Hence, absent some constitutional, statutory, or overriding policy basis requiring a
departure from the common-law rule in this case, we would discern no error in the admission of the
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Breaking Rules in Criminal Cases

. The Supreme Court has sanctioned admission of evidence obtaine<! by
prosecuti<;>n conduct that was admittedly "objectionable as a matter of ethics." 323 In
Moran u Burbine, the police lied to the defendant's lawyer, assuring her that she
need not come to the police station that night because her client would not be
interrogated. Less than an hour later, however, the police began a series of
interrogations that resulted in a confession. Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor expressed distaste for the "deliberate deception" of "an officer of the
court." 324 Nevertheless, the Court rejected claims under the Mira1u:la rule, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right 'to counsel, and due process, and
admitted the evidence that the prosecution had wrongfully obtained. Thus, the
Supreme Court has condoned what it has explicitly recognized to be unethical
prosecutorial conduct.
Further, the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are forbidden to use
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on grounds of race or gender.325 But if a
prosecutor is challenged for doing so, his justification on race-neutral grounds can
suffice regardless of whether it is "persuasive, or even plausible."328 Indeed, a
judge is permitted to accept a prosecutor's justification even if it is "fantastic . . .
silly, or superstitious."327
Moreove~·. the prosecutor is permitted to use both race ·and gender as grounds
for disqualifying jurors, as long as he can assert "legitimate reasons tangentially
connected with their race."3211 In Galbert u Merkle, 329 for example, the prosecutor
a8serted that he had excluded black women who were young and obese (the only
African-Americans on the jury panel), because they are '·'really dangerous to
me."330 Because the prosecutor claimed to have used youth and obesity along with
r ace and gender, his peremptory challenges were upheld.

The same prohibition against using race or gender as a basis for peremptory
challenges applies to defense counsel.331 Smith has argued, however, that the
obligation of zealous advocacy ought to trump the prohibition against race-based
jury selection by criminal defendants. 332 She takes this position notwithstanding
her per sonal dislike of racial and gender stereotyping, and her concern that, in the
challenged testimony even if an ethical violation were established."); Thbbi v. Town of Tonawanda, 111
Misc. 2d 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (same).
Moran v. Burbine, ~75 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986).
/d. at 423, 424.
32
~ Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)

323
·

324

(gender).
3 26

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).

3 27

[d.

3211

United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1987).
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2081 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1997).
330 / d. at •s.
331 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
332 See generally Abbe Smith, "Nice Work ifYou Can Get It": "Ethical" J1try Selection in Criminal
Defense, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 523 (1998).
329
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name of effective advocacy, she may be teaching studen~ to engaged in bigoted or
at least stereotypical thinking. Smith believes that her ethical obligation to defend
the accused333 means that she must make use of research regarding race and
gender in juror decision-making, even if doing so results in excluding prospective
jurors because of r ace or gender. It is not that sHe believes that racial or
demographic stereotypes are an accura'te proxy for the attitudes and life
experience of prospective jurors.384 Rather, in view of limited voir dire in most
criminal trials, 335 'it would be less than diligent lawyering to disregard what is
known about the 'influence of r ace and gender on jurors' attitudes.
·
At the beginning of this section, we raised the question of whether zealous
representation ever justifies breaking other ethical rules. We do not advise others
to do so. For ourselves, however, the answer is yes - "when justified by
inconsistencies in the Model Rules, the Scope section of the MQdel Rules, the
client's constitutional rights, court decisions, biblical authorities, and moral
philosophy."334

§ 4.1~
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One of the most serious attacks on the traditional ethic of zeal goes under the
deceptively benigp. banner of increasing civility, courtesy, and professionalism
among lawyers. 3~7 .Th~:J proponents of these notions mean a variety of very., different
things, .,.
but ·the end .result is ,the subordination of zealoUfo representation to vague
an,d sqmetimes unethical notions of civilit,y.338 In addition, the enflmnOqs amounts of
time anp resourc;es !:qat have gone into the "civility movement" have; distracted th.e
profession from dealing with the severe ethical and constitutio~ problems
333 See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspecti1Je8 em Legal Pra.ctice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985)
(acknowledging that "the case for undilu~ partisanship is mo(!t compelling'' ·in criminal defense),
~4 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY 171 (1994) ("[Social science data] generates probabilistic
statements about the attitudes or biases of a specific group. WitPin limits, probabilistic theorem~ fllay be
of use to lawy~. enabling them tp play the odds or make educated bets.").
33!1 See RANDALL l{ENNtfDY, RAcE, CmWE, k"'D THE LAw 220--27 (1997) (discussing the deficienciel\ of.voir
dire as it is typiCally conducted); see also Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B. U. L. R~. 923,
930 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. AoLtR, THE JuRr. TRIAL AND ERROR m THE AMERICAN CoURTROOM (1994))
("As long as voir dire is limited and counsel is prevented from exploring juror predispositions· in a
meaningful way, peremptory challenges are an important safety valve.").
334 See Monroe Freedman, In PmiBe ofOverzealom Representation - Lying to Judges, Deceiving
Third Parties, and Otlurr Ethical Ctmduct, 34 HoFSTRA L. REV. 771 (2006).
337 Typically, proponents hark back nostalgically to a golden age when, they say, lawyers were
universally respected and law was an honored profession. The golden age, however, is a myth. See
Monroe Freedman, A Brief "ProjessiondH Histcry, LroAL T!~o~ES, Dec. 17, 1990, at 22; Monroe
Freedman, The Good Old Days, for Good Old Boys, LroAL 'I'rA!ES, Feb. 28, 1994, at'31; Monroe Freedman,
Abraham Lincoln: Lawytr jOT the Twenty-F'int CentuTy?, LEGAL TtNES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 26; Marc
Galant.er, Lawyer8 in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996).
338 For example, in a panel discussion among four lawyers, two law professors, and a judge, Professor
Fl-eedman was "the only one who believed that zealous client advocacy is more important than being
civil." Amy Travison, Zealousness May Be Too Rampam in the Legal Profesaicm, N.Y. STATE BAR NEWS,
Mar/Apr. 1996, at 22; BeB also Abbe Smith, Burt:kning the LeCUJt of Us: "Race-Comcious" Ethics in
Oriminal Defense,.77 Tu. L. REV. 1599-1601 (1999) (lamenting the call for restraint>over passion in
criminal defense advocacy).
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resulting from the underfunding and overloading of public defenders' and prosecutors' offices and of the administration of justice in general.3311
The civility movement began in hysteria in the early 1970s in a series of speeches
by then Chief Justice Warren Burger. His immediate targets were lawyers
representing unpopular clients in civil rights, civil liberties, and criminal cases.
Chief Justice Burger charged that "adrenalin-fueled lawyers" were engaged in
wide-ranging improprieties, from disruption of court proceedings to seeing how
loud-they could shout or·h'ow many people, including judges, they could insult. As·a
result, Burger claimed, "rules of evidence, canons of ethics and codes of professional
conduct - the necessity for civility - all become irrelevant."340
The facts. were otherwise. In 1971, the New fork Times conducted-.a survey and
interviews with legal authorities around the country. It found that courtroom
disorder was "not a serious or growing problem."341 Similarly, an extensive study
sponsored by the Association Qf the Bar of the City of New York concluded that
"there is no serious quantitative problem of disruption in American Courts."342 But
the facts did not matter. Chief Justice Burger continued his crusade and by 1984
was successful in promoting an ABA Commission on Professionalism. As a reSult,
we now have !m ABA Creed of Professionalism and about 100 similar courtesy codes
and civility guidelines throughout the country.
The supporters of these creeds, codes, and guid~lines jn~ist that they simply
exhort lawyers to behave with civility and that they are not intended to be enforced.
Increasingly, howeve;, judges are enforcing· cjvi1ity with a variety of sanctions
against both lawyers and clients.343 For example, judges have explicitly threatened
sanctions against lawyers who violate civility codes.344:Judges have also censured
lawyers, by name, for conduct that is required by ethical rules but tha~ the judges
nevertheless consider "unprofessional."345 The most pernicious sanction, and the
one calaplated most effectively to chill zealous advocacy, was described by Chief
Judge Marvin Aspen of the United State~ Distrj.ct Court for the North~rn District
of Illino~s. 3;'8 If a·lawyet; .~oes something "unseemly" in court, the judge will. gossip
about jt over lunch with other judges, identifying th,e lawyer by name. As a result,
Aspen has said, the lawyer's reputation will be "tremendously'' and. ''irreparably''
damaged - and thereafter all the judges will take the opportunity tq decide against

3311

See, e.g., MICHAEL McCoNVILLE & Ca&STEn L. MIRSKY, CRIMINAL D&FENSE oF THE Poon IN NEW YORK
Cm (Center for Reseatch in Crime and Justice at N.Y.U. Law School, 1989); MOnroe Freedman, Thi'rrl.
W<Wld_Justiu, LEGAL TrMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 34.
340
See, e.g., WatTen E. Burger, The Nece$sity !<W Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 212-14 (1971).
341 N.Y 'furEs, Aug. 9, 1971, at 1.
3 2
•
NoRMAN DonsEN & LEON FmeoMAN, DISORDER IN THE CoURT 6 (1974).
343 Federal District Court Chief Judge Marvin Aspen, a leader in the civili.ty movement, bas
acknowledged that "moral exhortations are not going to be enough" to ensure civility. Jeffrey Colo,
Searching f<W Collegiality: An Interview wi1Jt, Judge Aspen, '22 A.B.A. Lrnc. 34, 87 (1996).
344
345
346

(1996).

See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Asso., 121 F.R.D. 284 (1988).
See Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883 (1981), qff'd, 776 S.W.2d 97 (1989). ·
Jeffrey Cole, Searching for ColLegiality: An Interview with J'Ud4e Aspen, 22 A.B.A. LJTIG. 34, 36
.
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the lawyer's clients any time a "close question" arises. 347 There is, of course, no due
process for either the lawyer or her clients when judges engage in this kind of
lunchroom Star Chamber.
Nor are the standards·clear for what Judge Aspen calls "unseemly" conduct. In
a survey on civility conducted by a Seventh Circuit committee chaired by Judge
Aspen, civilitJL, was defined expansively as "professional conduct in litigating
proceedings," and expressly included "good manners or social grace."348 Thus, a
lawyer responding that she had seen incivility in litigation could be referring to
anything from incompetence to loud ties or garish lipstick. 3451
Just how misguided and' misleading the rules of civility can be is illustrated by a
panel discussion before the Chicago Bar Association. 350 The moderator, Robert
Cummins, posed the. following hypothetical: Opposing counsel calls you to request
a short extension of time to file a pleading so that he can attend his son's graduation.
It would not prejudice your client in any material way to grant the extension. Would
you gral.!t it to him?
Five members of the panel said they would refuse to grant the extension. The five
included not only the then current and past presid~nts of the Bar, but also Judge
Aspen, the leading proponent of civility. Professor Freedman was the only
dissenter, explaining that because the extension would not prejudice the client,
there was no reason to deprive opposing counsel and his son of sharing an important
event in their lives. Judge Aspen and the other panelists offered no cogent reason
'
'
for saying that they would refuse· the extension.
Unfortunately, however, incivility can also mean representing one's client
competently and zealously. Consider, for example, the remarks of Federal District
Judge William Schwartzer, then Director of the Federal Judicial center. At an ABA
conference,351 Judge Schwartzer illustrated professionalism by recalling that, when
he was a young lawyer, his'research revealed that his client could win a case because
the lawyer on the 6ther side•had miSsed a statute of limitations. When he reported
the good news to the partner in charge of the case, however, the older lawyer sternly
admonished the neophyte that "we don't practice law like that in this office." That
is, tire firm would not rely' on the statute on its client's behalf because it would
embarrass the lawyers on the other side to do so. The judge concluded the anecdote
with the approving comment: "That made a great impression on me."~2
The leading case. on enforcing courtesy codes is Dondi Properties tt Commerce

347

!d. at 36. Aspen repeated these threats at an ABA conference in Chicago on May 31, 1996.

34t

148 F.R.D. 441, n.1 (1992).

3451

In a series of exchanges on Lexi&/Counsel Connect, for example, de1initions of civility ranged
widely, from fraud and deceit to not returning te~ephone calls. In between were: being a junk-yard dog;
being sneaky, mean or misleading; not being ethical; failing to provide discovery; obstructing discovery;
badgering witnesses; ignoring deadlines; being rude; and being -a jerk.
350

Feb. 2, 2000.

351

ABA conference in '1\icson, Arizona, .f$ruary ~. 1995.

3112

For a discussion of taking advantage of an adversary's mistake, see App. B, infra.
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Samngs &.£oanAss'n.3S3 There,·the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Texas, ,sitting en bane, announced its intention to imP.ose sanctions against
lawyers who failed to abide by an aspirational courtesy code-adopted by the ba:r. In
one of the cases under Dondi, the plaintiff was suing forth~ defendant's alleged bad
faith refusal to pay off an insuraQce claim. The defense lawyers were apparently
emulating their client in using delay to avoid their client's legal obligfltion. They not
only filed an untimely reply brief, but they failed to get consent of the plaintiff and
failed to get leave of the court - both required by court rules. In responding to a
motion to dismiss the improper reply brief, ·therefore, the court expressed its
concern that justice delayed is justice denied, and it criticized the "sharp practices"

of counsel.3$4
Who could disagree with that judicial resnonse? The court went on,. however, to
express its intention to impose sanctions against lawyers, like the plaintiff's lawyer,
who had "failed to cooperate [with defendant's lawyers] when he filed the motion to
strike the reply."355 That is, by asserting his client's right under the.,rules of the
court to· move to sJ;rike the untimely brief, the plaintiff's lawyer had invited
sanctions against hims~lf und~r the courtesy code. A particular irony is that a
principal target of courtesy codes are lawyers who ignore d~adlin.fls and·delay cases.
A Misso\ui-case ech6es Judge Schwartzer's understanding 6f pr6fessionalism. In

Sprung tt Nef!U!er Materials, lnc.,358 the plaintiff had ~offered sever~ back and leg
injuries. when a crut supplied by the defendant f~·QV_er, throwing a load of dry wall
on him. After receiving service of a complaint, the defendant's lawyer negli~ently
failed to serve or file an answer. At the ~ppropriate time, the plaintiff's lawyer
moved f'or a default judgment, which was, granted.
Fourteen days after the default, the defendant's lawyer filed an untimely answer

to the complaint. The plaintiff asked his lawyer what that meant. The lawyer
explained that the answer was too late to affect the default, that the default would
become final within thirty days after its entry, and that there was no legal obligation
to inform the defense about the default. The plaintiff then instructed his lawyer not
to tell the defendant's lawyer about the default until after the thirty days had run,
and the lawyer obeyed his client's instructions, as he was ethically required to do.357
The court could have vacated the judgment, of course, but declined to do so, on
the ground that the defendant's lawyer had been negligent. Nevertheless, the Chief
Judge and three other judges on the Missouri Supreme Court castigated the
plaintiff's lawyer (who was identified by name 358) for his lack of professionalism in
giving his client the lawful benefit of the default. These opinions make it clear that
the judges expected the'" lawyer to place courtesy to his "brother lawyer"359 over the
rights of hi/) client. One opinion refers to ethical rules, lil{e zealous representation,
353
354
355
3

&&

121 F.R.D. 284 (1988).
I d. at 286.
I d. at 291.
7'2:7 S.W.2d 883 (1987), ajf'd, 775 S.W.2d 97 (1989).

3117

MR 1.6.

358

Sprung, 727 S.'f.2d at 895.
ld, at 894.

359
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as "jargon"leO that should not supersede "courtesy and consideration" to opposing
counsel. 361 Another opinion refers to the plaintiff's lawyer as a "sharp practitioner"362 whose conduct "should shock all right-thinking lawyers!'3e3 The judges
conclude: "There are members of the bench and bar who can remember when
[professional courtesy] would have included advance warning to a dilatory attorney
adversary of intent to seek a default and immediate notice that one had been
obtained."364
There are two ironies in these opinions. One is that the judges expected the
plaintiff's lawyer to give the defendant greater rights than the court itself was
willing to give. 365 The second is that the judges had no problem with a lawyer's
enforcing the default ~gainst an unrepresented defendant; it was only when a
''brother lawyer" entered the pictUfe that counsel's conduct became shocking,
dishonorable, and uhprofessional.3ee
An example of a jurisdiction attempting to subordinate zealous representation to
notions of professionalism and courtesy is Georgia. 367 As one Georgia 'judge has
stated, enforcement of ethical rules requiring zealous advocacy could leave the
professionalism movement "dead in the water."368 It follows, of course, that the
success of the professionali~m movement could destroy zealous advocacy.
TMre are lawyers we respect who promote creeds of professionalism and civility.
They a.ssume that these creeds' are harmless. Perhaps they are relying on typical
clause~ in such creeds that say that they are not intended to supersede or amend
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other disciplinary codes. But "aspirational"
creeds are increasingly being given the force of law by judges who value courtesy
to "brother lawyers" above "entire devotion to the interests of the client [and] warm
zeal in the maintenance·and defense of his rights."369

360

ld.

361 Id. at 893.
362 Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 110.
363 Id. at 109.
364

ld. at 111.

365 The opposite result was reached in Kleinecke v. Montecito Water Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 240 (1983)
(Gilbert, J.) (The court tolled a statute of limitations to correct an error by plaint.ifts lawyer, but said:
"Our holding is not an indictment of defense counsel who by fortuitous circUmstances had the
opportunity to represent his client in a manner sanctioned by [prior case law).").
388
See Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, Proposed
Standards, 11 18, 148 F.R.D. 441 (1992): "We will not cause any default or dismissal to be entered without
first notifying opposing coume4 when we krww his or her identity." (emphasis added).,,, '
367 See Allen v. Lef'koff, Duncan, Grimes & Denner P.C., 403 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 1995); Green v. Green,
437 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1993); Evanoff v. Evanoff, 418 S.E.2d 62 (Ga.'1992).
368 AUen, 463 S.E.2d at 726.
369 For a critique of civility codes, see Amy R. Mashburn, Professiona.lism aa Class Ideology: Civility
Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. Rev. 657 (1994).
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§ 4.13 UNETHICAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT

CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
I •

The most serious and widespread violations.Qf professional ethics occur in the
failure to provide competent, conflict-free representation to indigent criminal
defendants. 370
In Gideon v. Waintvright, 371 the Supreme Court held that before a state can
imprison an indigent per.sop as a felon, due process requires that the state provide
him with "the· guiding liirlld of counsel at every step of the proceedings against
him." 372 Without that guidlng hand of'counsel, ''though [the accused) be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not lrnow how to establish his
innocence."373 Nevertheless, as Steven Bright, Director of the Southern Center for
Human Rights has said, "[n)o constitutional right is celebrated so much in the
abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel."374
One way the states have pw·ported to meet their constitutional obligation to
counsel to poor people accused of crimes has heel} through co\]rt-appoin~d
lawyers. However, the paltry compensation paid for these services has generally
been inadequate to attract competent lawyers. 375 I n addition, judges have too often
selected court-appointed lawyers precisely because the lawyers are incompetent,
an.d c~n be counted on to move the courts' calendars quickly by entering hasty guilty
pleas in virtually all cases.378 In those few cases in which the accused insists on his
right to tri.al, the trials move rapidly because these court-appointed lawyers file no
motions, conduct no investigations, and do little else to put the state to its burden
of proof.
provid~

I

Fot: example, an ex~nsive study under the auspices of NYU Law School's Center
:

.

370 See-THE CoNSTmJTTON PROJEcr, JuSTICE DENIED: AMERICA's CONTINUING NEGLECT or Oun CoNSTITU·
TIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (study of indigent defense by a national
cornmis.sion of which Professor Freedman was a member); Monroe Freedman, An Eth.ical Manifestof(ll'
Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911 (2005); Steven N. Yermish, Etkical1$8'UU in Indigent Defense:
The Qnttinuing Orisis of Euessive Caseloads, THE CR.UiPIOll, June 2oo9, at 22.
371 372 U.S. 335, 345, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 258 (1963). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 u:s. 25 (1972)
(counsel is constitutionally required in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is a possible sentence).
372
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 845, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 258 (1963), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68 (1932). See also Atyersinger, 407 U.S. at 25 (counsel is constitutionally required in
misdemeanor cases In which imprisonment is a possible sentence).
373 -Jd.
374

Stephen B. Bright, Gideon's Reality: After Four Decades, Where Are We? CnrM. JuST. 6 (Summer
2003). See also JuSTICE DENIED, supra note 370; ABA, CRIMINAL J uSTicE IN CRISIS: A REPORT TO THE
AAI:ERICAN PEOPL& AND THE Ala:RJCAN BAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SoME MYTHS, SoME
RBALITII:S, AND So~IB QllES'I'rONS FOR THE FuTURE 6 (1988); DEBORAH L. RHODE, AccESS TO J uSTICE ch. 6
(''Presumed Guilty: Class Injustice in Criminal Justice") (2004); Bruce A Green, Indioent Difensejrom
an Legal Ethi~ Perspective, 52 EMoRY L.J. 1169 (2003); The Spangenberg Group, Rates of Compensation Paid tc Court Appointed Counsel in Non-Fel.cny Ca8es at 11rWl.: A Srou-by-StaU Overview, A B.A.
j, (2003); Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent Difense: The Continui1tg Cri8i.s 'of Excessive
C<u!eloczd3, THs CHAMPION, June 2009, at 22.
• 375 !d.
376
Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: htdicuu Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32
HoFSTIIA L. REV. 1349 (2004).
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for Research in Crime and Justice found that New York's court-appointed lawyer
system has failed to provide any sembliillce of effective assistance of ~ounsel to
indigent defendants. 377 The lawyers are paid on the basis of vouchers for the time
spent on each case. There is therefore every irtcentive' for the lawyers to record
faithfully, if not to exaggerate, the time they have spent. Yet the vouche1's reveal'the
following statistics:
•

Interviewing and counseling
'No time recorded for interviewing and counseling the client in 75% ·~f the
homicide cases, pr in S2% of other felony cases;378

•

Discovery
No time recorded for discovery in 92% of the homicide cases or in 93.6% of
other felony cases;379

•

I nvestigation
No time recorded for investigations' in 72.8% of the homicide cases or in
87.8% of other felonies;380 and

• , Pre-Trial Motions
No 'time recorded for written pre-trial motions in 74.5% of the homicide
cases or in 80.4% of other felonies; 381
•
.,

The same study neverlheless
ctmcluded that this system of court-appointed
I
lawyers "must be understood as a success from the perspective of those who
designed the system and now maintain it," that is, "to make the criminal law a more
effective means for securing social control at minimal expense to the state' and to the
private bar . . . by compelling guilty pleas and by other non-trial dispositions."382
I

) . ..

•

The other means of providing lawyers to poor people has been through public
defender and legal aid offices.383 There, the problem has not been so much the
incompetence of the lawyers, but the fact that t~e offices typi~y are seriously
underfunded. This leads to overloading lawyers with far more clients than any
lawyer could competently represent.384

377

Chester Mirsky & M. McConville, Criminal Defense ofthe Poor in New York City, 15-N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 581 (1987). This research was conducted in 1987, but there Is no reason to believe tllat
circumstances have changed for the better since then. See generally J uSTICE DENIED, supra note 370.
378 /d. at 758.
379
/d. at 761.
380
/d. at 762.
381
Id. ab767.
382
/d. at 87~77. 902.
383
Legal aid offices are private organizations that contract with the government to provide legal
assistance to poor people; public defenders, like prosecutors, are funded directly by the government.
384
'Throughout the United States, indigent defense systems are struggling. 'Due to funding
shortfalls [and) excessive caseloads ... many are truly falling. Justice Denied: America's Continuing
Neglect-of o~,r ConstitUtional Right to Counsel (2009). The entire criminal justice system is starved for
resources." ABA, CRIMINAL Jusrrcs IN CRISIS: A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR oN
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' tinder universally recognized rules and standards, lawyers are forbidden to
represent indigent criminal defendants when the lawyers are burdened by underfunding and overload.ing.385 Accordingly, when lawyers are assigned to represent
~~fendants ~mder circumstances in which they cannot perform competently and
fr~e of conflicts of interes~ they are reQ).lired to ~e the following actions.
First, a lawyer who is assigned to represent a client in a criminal case, and who
is unable to give competent and unconflicted representation to th-at client, is
ethically required to decline the representation. 386
Second, if the lawyer has a supervisor who nevertheless orders her to take the
case, the supernsor bas·committed a serious ethical violation,,.7 and the lawyer bas
an ethical obligation to report the supervisor's unethical conduct to· the appropriate
disciplinary authority. 388
Third, the lawyer may.be required under rules of the court, and therefore under
ethical rules, to obtain permission of the court to decline the assignment. 389
However, it would be an ethical violation for a judge to order the lawyer to
undertake a case in which the lawyer would necessarily be violating both the Sixth
Amendment and ethical rules relating to competent, unconflicted representation, or
to proceed with a criminal proceeding knowing that the defendant had not been
competently counseled.390 The lawyer would therefore be required to report the
judge's unethical conduct to th~ appropriate judiciai disciplinary authority. 3111
Fourth, the lawyer would be required to put on the record in. the cas~ the fact
that, because of obligations to other clients, the lawyer cannot give competent,
conflict-free representation to the new client-392 This would establish a violation of
the Sixth Amendment, because the entry of a guilty plea is a critical stage,
regardless of whether the charge is a felony or a misdemeanor.3113
Fifth, the lawyer would be required to inform the client of any plea offer from the
prosecutor.394 However, the lawyer would also be required to infonn the client that
her representation of the client cannot be performed competently395 and, specifiCRUIVIAL JuSTtcE rN 'l'fiE UP11'1'!:D STATES: 8oMB MYTHS, Som: R&u.m&s, AND Som QUESTIONS roR THE FurUJu:
5 (1988). The explicit reference is to both federal and state jurisdictions.
:tall

See Freedman, Att Ethical Manifesto fqr Public Defe-ndera, supra. note 870.

380

MR 1.7(a)(2); MR 1.16(aXl); JuSTICE DENIED, supra. note 870, at 202.

387

MR 6.l(c)(l).

318

MR 8.3(a).
1.16(c).

3111 .MR

390 ABA MonEL Coos or JUDICIAL CoNouor (2007) Rule 2.6: "Ensuring the Right to Be Heard." Rule
2.6(A): "A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's
lawyer, the right to be heard according to law." Rule 2.2: "A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and
shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." Rule 2.5(A): ·~ judge shall perform
judicial . . . duties competently and diligently."
3 1
'

MR 8.3(b).
u:z Se6 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO

393

4

Til& DEn:Nsc

FuNorroN §§ 4-8.2(b), 8.6(c). •

Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).

MR 1.4; ABA BTANDAitDS RELATING ro PLSAS or GUILTY § 14-8.2(a).
3' ' MR 1.4; ABA STANDARDS R!:LATIIIG TO THI!l D EFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.5(b).
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cally, that she does not know enough about the case to give the dient any legal
advice.396 Further, she would be forbidden to advise the client to accept the plea
offer.3117

Sixth, if the client chooses to accept the plea offer, the lawyer would be required
to put on the record that she has not advised 'the client with regard to the plea
because to do so would violate her ethical obligations, of competent and conflict-free
t·epresentation. 3118
If court-appointed lawyers acted in accordance with these ethical obligations,
they would: first, establish compelling· records of the extent to which the constitutional promise of Gideon is being broken; second, give individual clients grounds to
attack their sentences. directly399 and collaterally;400 third, establish the basis for
class actions on behalf of their clients and other defendants who have similarly been
denied the right to counsel; fourth, provide the news media with dxamatic soUl'ce
material fox informing the public about the faillll'es of the administration of criminal
justice; and, fifth, make it more difficult for society ?-nd for the established bar to
continue to deny due process and the effective assistance of counsel to indigent
criminal defendants.
Moreover, by honoring their ethical obligations, assigned counsel would cease to
serve as an essential part of a fraudulent cover-up of the denial of fundamental
rights to. countl.e ss poor people who are caught up in a ctiminal justice system that
is unethical, unconstitutional, and intolerably cruel.401 Half a century of constitutional lind ethical' hypocrisy is enough. 402
'

396

Id.

397

ABA STA>'IDARD5 R ELATING TO THE D EPEI'ISE F WCTJOI'I § 4-6.l (b); ABA STANDARDS R ELATING TO PLEAS

OF GUILTY
398

§ 14-3.2(b).

ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO TilE DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-8.2(b), 8.6(c).
39t Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (a total depr]vatiqn o! couns~J is a structural
violation requiring reversal without harmless error analysis).
400
See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.), 136 (Ginsburg, J.), where the
Supreme Court was unanimous in recognizing that c1iminal defendants who plead guilty without the
benellt of counsel have the· right to challenge their sentences and (at least after exhausting state
remedies) to seek injunctions against the pJ;:actice under 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983. See also Gardner v. Florida,
430 u.~. 349, 358 <1977).
401
Evel'y time a lawyer falsely gives the impression in court th:tt a client who is pleading guilty has
received effective, competent, contlictrfree representation, she is violating MR 8.4(c) by engaging in
dishonest conduct.
·
402 Although Smith shares Freedman's concerns about the quality of indigent defense in the United
States, and agrees tha~ there are circumstances under which,individual p)lblic defenders should take the
steps suggested in the text, she understands how difftcult this may be in practice. She believes that
directors of public defender offices have an institutional responsibility to resist excessive caseloads. See
Editorial, More Public Defenders, CoURmR-JouRNAL, Oct. 25, 2006,<at SA (noting the successful effort of
Louisville. Kentucky Public Defender Dan Goyette to obtain funding for additional defenders).

